Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-drip-rid-07

[Robert Moskowitz <[e-mail]>]

Magnus,

Thank you for your comments.  I have been with minimal connectivity due 
to storm induced power outage.

I did push out ver 08.  I quick read through your comments show I fixed 
other stuff.

I will go over your comments and get with CFRG (and about some light 
crypto stuff) in the coming weeks.

Bob

On 7/24/21 1:14 AM, Magnus Nyström wrote:
> I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's 
> ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the 
> IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the 
> security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat 
> these comments just like any other comments.
>
> This document describes the use of "Hierarchical Host Identity Tags" 
> as self-asserting IPv6 addresses and thereby trustable identifiers for 
> use as Remote IDs.
>
> As the security of HHITs to a large degree relies on the security of 
> the cryptographic constructs and primitives described in this 
> document, I would recommend that the IRTF CFRG or a similar group with 
> cryptographic expertise reviews this memo (unless it has already been 
> done).
>
> The security of the HHITs also seem to depend to a large degree on the 
> registrars (registry operators) that will act as backstops to ensure 
> no duplicate registrations etc. It might be helpful with a clear 
> statement as to the conditions that must be met by registrars in order 
> for this scheme to be secure.
>
> As noted, the use of a 64-bit hash is weak when considering pre-image 
> attacks. I do not understand the constraints the authors have been 
> working under in this context enough to say if there was an option for 
> a longer hash, but I think this should be part of the above suggested 
> CFRG review.
>
> The text "Another mitigation of HHIT hijacking is if the HI owner (UA) 
> supplies an object containing the HHIT and signed by the HI private 
> key of the HDA such as Appendix E.1 
> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-drip-rid#appendix-E.1> 
> as shown in Section 3.5" 
> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-drip-rid#section-3.5> 
> confuses me a bit since I don't see how the subject of an attack would 
> be able to tell should the HHIT hijack attempt occur before the HI 
> owner has supplied such an object?
>
> Lastly, the statement "The authors believe that the probability of 
> such an attack is low when Registry operators are using best 
> practices" seems weak and would preferably be backed with some more 
> quantitative analysis or at least specific statements around best 
> practices and how they would reduce the probability.
>
> Editorial: The document is in need of a grammar / wording polish but I 
> expect the rfc-editors to handle this.
>
> Thanks,
> -- Magnus
>
>