Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-kuegler-ipsecme-pace-ikev2

Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Thu, 14 April 2011 17:41 UTC

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Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2011 12:41:57 -0500
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From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>
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Cc: "draft-kuegler-ipsecme-pace-ikev2@tools.ietf.org" <draft-kuegler-ipsecme-pace-ikev2@tools.ietf.org>, "secdir@ietf.org" <secdir@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-kuegler-ipsecme-pace-ikev2
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On Thu, Apr 14, 2011 at 12:35 PM, Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:
>  I'm not sure that salting really buys anything. This is not a client-
> server protocol; either side can initiate to each other. So both sides
> need an _identical_ representation of the credential to authenticate with.
> If there is some agreed-upon salt then the salted password becomes
> the credential to use. This is no different than just using an unsalted
> password. The nonces from the IKE exchange are used in PACE to provide
> additional randomness to its particular use of the password.

This is important.  I hadn't realized that PACE was intended to be
initiated in either direction.  When one of the peers is a device
acting on behalf of a user (who knows just a their username and
password) and the other is a system that has access to SPwd (the
shared secret derived from the password), then it's important that the
peer that sends the ENONCE first be the device where the user is at,
else the active attack on PACE gets much simpler (since impersonating
the user device is probably simpler than impersonating the other one).

Nico
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