Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-jose-jws-signing-input-options-06

[Kathleen Moriarty <[e-mail]>]

Mike,

Sorry, I take that back.  The chairs make a good point in the shepherd
writeup.  This really doesn't update 7519, so it should not say that
in the abstract.

Thanks.

On Sun, Dec 13, 2015 at 10:05 PM, Kathleen Moriarty
<[e-mail]> wrote:
> Mike,
>
> Please do add that to the abstract and post as soon as you can with
> all updates from last call received so far and agreed upon.
>
> Thanks,
> Kathleen
>
> On Sat, Dec 12, 2015 at 10:30 PM, Mike Jones
> <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> Sounds good.  Thanks, Kathleen.
>>
>>                                 -- Mike
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Kathleen Moriarty [mailto:[e-mail]]
>> Sent: Saturday, December 12, 2015 7:28 PM
>> To: Mike Jones <[e-mail]>
>> Cc: Benjamin Kaduk <[e-mail]>; [e-mail]; [e-mail]; [e-mail]
>> Subject: Re: secdir review of draft-ietf-jose-jws-signing-input-options-06
>>
>>
>>
>> Sent from my iPhone
>>
>>> On Dec 12, 2015, at 9:33 PM, Mike Jones <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi Ben,
>>>
>>> Thanks for the useful review.  Replies are inline below...
>>>
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> From: Benjamin Kaduk [mailto:[e-mail]]
>>>> Sent: Friday, December 11, 2015 10:05 AM
>>>> To: [e-mail]; [e-mail];
>>>> draft-ietf-jose-jws-signing-input-
>>>> [e-mail]
>>>> Subject: secdir review of
>>>> draft-ietf-jose-jws-signing-input-options-06
>>>>
>>>> Hi all,
>>>>
>>>> I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
>>>> ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the
>>>> IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the
>>>> security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat
>>>> these comments just like any other last call comments.
>>>>
>>>> This document is Ready.
>>>>
>>>> The main JWS spec (RFC 7515) required that the signed payload was
>>>> base64url-encoded prior to signing.  This results in a noticeable
>>>> size expansion; in some circumstances it is desirable to avoid this
>>>> expansion and reencoding.  I did not follow the JWS document closely
>>>> at the time, but I believe this issue was raised at the time and
>>>> consensus reached on the published version because it is always safe for applications to use.
>>>> This document provides an opt-in mechanism for application
>>>> (protocol)s to avoid the extra encoding and expansion, leaving the
>>>> burden on the application to determine whether it is safe to do so
>>>> and perform the relevant input checking/sanitization.  The security
>>>> considerations correctly describe the implications of the loss of
>>>> encoding and the restrictions on the signed content when detached
>>>> payloads are not used, interoperability concerns for applications not
>>>> supporting the b64 header parameter, and proposes appropriate countermeasures.
>>>
>>> Thanks for letting us know that the security considerations were clear.
>>>
>>>> Interestingly, this document does not need to update the JWS spec,
>>>> since it is just adding to an IANA registry and not modifying the
>>>> core spec, but it does update the JWT spec (RFC 7519) to prohibit the
>>>> use of b64=false in JWTs.  No justification is made for this
>>>> restriction in the text of the document, but it seems reasonable to "play it safe" in this sense, to me.
>>>
>>> The restriction is there for interoperability reasons.  I added the phrase "For interoperability reasons" to my working copy of the document so this reason is stated.
>>>
>>>> I do have a few nits unrelated to the security review:
>>>>
>>>> The abstract mentions the "Updates: 7519", but the introduction does
>>>> not; I am sometimes told that both locations should mention the
>>>> update, but I assume that the RFC Editor will notice if anything needs to change.
>>>
>>> The restriction is listed (and now motivated!) in the "Intended Use by Applications" section.  That being said, if the RFC editor wants it repeated elsewhere, that would be fine.
>>>
>> I think Ben is correct on this.  I'll check tomorrow and get back to you donut can be included in your update to save ADs time during their reviews.
>>
>> Thanks for the review Ben!
>>
>> Kathleen
>>>> It is a bit amusing that the example with payload "$.02" is actually
>>>> longer with the unencoded payload, due to the overhead of the header
>>>> field, but I do not suggest modifying the example at this time.
>>>
>>> Yep - that is amusing.  I hadn't realized that, but it makes sense.
>>>
>>>> Section 5.3 makes reference to Section 8.3 of RFC 7159 for JSON
>>>> string-escape processing, but I think perhaps section 7 of that RFC
>>>> would be a better reference.
>>>
>>> The language you're referring to is actually directly copied from Section 5.3 of JWS [RFC 7519] because it's intended to have exactly the same meaning.  For consistency reasons between this spec and JWS, I'm reluctant to change the reference, even though I understand your point.
>>>
>>>> Relatedly, I needed to reread the text in Section 5.3 a few times in
>>>> order to convince myself that I correctly understood the procedure
>>>> for generating the payload to be signed, but I believe that all the
>>>> steps given are necessary and correct, and do not have proposed text
>>>> that would be better.  String-escape processing is just inherently fiddly.
>>>
>>> Again, because this language is from an already approved RFC and since you believe it is correct, I'm reluctant to fiddle with it.
>>>
>>>> I did not attempt to verify the examples' encoding and consistency.
>>>
>>> Others have done so (and are thanked in the Acknowledgements).
>>>
>>>> Thanks for this well-written document.
>>>
>>> Thanks for the useful review!  Unless I hear objections to these resolutions and those to Robert's Gen-ART review, I'll plan to publish the updated document shortly.
>>>
>>>> -Ben
>>>
>>>                Best wishes,
>>>                -- Mike
>>>
>
>
>
> --
>
> Best regards,
> Kathleen



-- 

Best regards,
Kathleen