[secdir] Re: [Last-Call] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-asdf-sdf-18

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Tue, 28 May 2024 20:33 UTC

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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
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Subject: [secdir] Re: [Last-Call] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-asdf-sdf-18
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Magnus Nyström via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> wrote:
    > - The Security Considerations section mentions the possible need for
    > confidentiality of an SDF model ("There may be confidentiality requirements on
    > SDF models, both on their content and on the fact that a specific model is used
    > in a particular Thing or environment"). Couldn't there also be a need for
    > integrity/authenticity of a given SDF model? The document is silent on this. -
    > Related to the previous point, was it ever discussed to allow for an integrity
    > or authenticity value accompanying or being part of an SDFThing instance?

For this document, the SDF models are generally used on a IoT gateway
*developers* desktop.  The model goes into some kind of code generator that
creates code that is deployed in the gateway's firmware.

So, _provence_ is the right word: the developer needs to pay attention to
where they downloaded these models from.

At present we *do not* expect SDF models to be used at runtime on a gateway
in a dynamic way.  So issues if integrity of the model are not so important.

Having said this; some of the work that the recharter anticipates *might* go
to a more dynamic model, but that's still future work.

--
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>   . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting )
           Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide