Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-roll-admin-local-policy-02

Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Wed, 14 January 2015 22:56 UTC

Return-Path: <mcr@sandelman.ca>
X-Original-To: secdir@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: secdir@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4B5D81ACF58; Wed, 14 Jan 2015 14:56:19 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.911
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.911 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.01] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id TOyyG14Lntho; Wed, 14 Jan 2015 14:56:17 -0800 (PST)
Received: from tuna.sandelman.ca (tuna.sandelman.ca [IPv6:2607:f0b0:f:3:216:3eff:fe7c:d1f3]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id F40CA1ACF54; Wed, 14 Jan 2015 14:56:16 -0800 (PST)
Received: from sandelman.ca (obiwan.sandelman.ca [IPv6:2607:f0b0:f:2::247]) by tuna.sandelman.ca (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1E9AF20098; Wed, 14 Jan 2015 18:02:04 -0500 (EST)
Received: by sandelman.ca (Postfix, from userid 179) id 71EE5637FE; Wed, 14 Jan 2015 17:56:15 -0500 (EST)
Received: from sandelman.ca (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by sandelman.ca (Postfix) with ESMTP id 5B362637F2; Wed, 14 Jan 2015 17:56:15 -0500 (EST)
From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: secdir@ietf.org, iesg@ietf.org, draft-ietf-roll-admin-local-policy.all@tools.ietf.org
In-Reply-To: <453df83f266b93c62a0eba7a871fbec8@xs4all.nl>
References: <7e9a24ab8a294586bc19f23673551c24@KLUSE610.infineon.com> <5e5cc9fe445de45d78bc05604a308da6@xs4all.nl> <75d052c652b043c88c3ecc3c469b6bcb@KLUSE610.infineon.com> <54AD33DA.5080006@gridmerge.com> <453df83f266b93c62a0eba7a871fbec8@xs4all.nl>
X-Mailer: MH-E 8.6; nmh 1.3-dev; GNU Emacs 24.4.2
X-Face: $\n1pF)h^`}$H>Hk{L"x@)JS7<%Az}5RyS@k9X%29-lHB$Ti.V>2bi.~ehC0; <'$9xN5Ub# z!G,p`nR&p7Fz@^UXIn156S8.~^@MJ*mMsD7=QFeq%AL4m<nPbLgmtKK-5dC@#:k
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="=-=-="; micalg=pgp-sha1; protocol="application/pgp-signature"
Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2015 17:56:15 -0500
Message-ID: <16546.1421276175@sandelman.ca>
Sender: mcr@sandelman.ca
Archived-At: <http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/IMWMKBO8EZ1oAWDq92LYRq7bM4A>
Cc: robert.cragie@gridmerge.com, consultancy@vanderstok.org
Subject: Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-roll-admin-local-policy-02
X-BeenThere: secdir@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: Security Area Directorate <secdir.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/secdir>, <mailto:secdir-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/secdir/>
List-Post: <mailto:secdir@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:secdir-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/secdir>, <mailto:secdir-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2015 22:56:19 -0000

peter van der Stok <stokcons@xs4all.nl>; wrote:
    > Incoming MPL4 messages, encrypted at layer 2, MUST be encrypted at
    > layer 2 at 
    > all outgoing interfaces. This is done either by decrypting at the
    > incoming 
    > interface and encrypting at the outgoing interface with the appropriate
    > keys

this works.

    > by sending the MPL4 message unmodified at the
    > outgoing interface.

This does not work in 15.4, it's just not how things work, because parts of
the packet changes, so the nonces change, etc.

<Steve.Hanna@infineon.com>; wrote:
    Steve> Thanks for addressing the issue that I raised.

    Steve> Your proposal is not very strong. If the border router has
    Steve> interfaces on two networks that both have layer 2 encryption, any
    Steve> device on either of those networks can cause the boundaries of the
    Steve> admin-local scope to be changed. Am I wrong?

I don't understand the attack.
Can you explain ?
All nodes with access to the raw data can replicate it elsewhere.
I think that you are suggesting that some node can cause the border router to
change it's admin-local scope.

-- 
Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>;, Sandelman Software Works
 -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-