Re: [secdir] secdir Review of draft-ietf-pcp-nat64-prefix64-04

[Stephen Hanna <[e-mail]>]

Med,

Thanks for addressing so many of my concerns. I'm happy with
the changes that you have made.

I didn't see a response to issue 9) below (about RFC 7050).
Do you have any plans to address that?

Thanks,

Steve

> -----Original Message-----
> From: [e-mail]
> [mailto:[e-mail]]
> Sent: Friday, January 24, 2014 3:56 AM
> To: Stephen Hanna; [e-mail]; The IESG; draft-ietf-pcp-nat64-
> [e-mail]
> Subject: RE: secdir Review of draft-ietf-pcp-nat64-prefix64-04
> 
> Dear Stephen,
> 
> Please see inline.
> 
> Cheers,
> Med
> 
> >-----Message d'origine-----
> >De : Stephen Hanna [mailto:[e-mail]]
> >Envoyé : jeudi 23 janvier 2014 16:20
> >À : BOUCADAIR Mohamed IMT/OLN; [e-mail]; The IESG; draft-ietf-
> pcp-
> >[e-mail]
> >Objet : RE: secdir Review of draft-ietf-pcp-nat64-prefix64-04
> >
> >Med,
> >
> >Thanks for your response. Coming along nicely!
> >
> >A few comments on your changes below, marked with [SRH].
> >
> >Thanks,
> >
> >Steve
> >
> >Med wrote:
> >> Steve wrote:
> >> >1) The second paragraph of the Security Considerations section
> >> >   points out that if an attacker can fool a host into using
> >> >   the wrong value for Pref64::/n, the traffic generated using
> >> >   that value will be delivered to the wrong location. That's
> >> >   right but not all the implications are mentioned. A MITM
> >> >   (Man In The Middle) attack can be performed in this manner,
> >> >   permitting alterations to the traffic (not just eavesdropping).
> >> >   This should be mentioned.
> >> [Med] I updated the text as follows:
> >>
> >> OLD:
> >>
> >>    As discussed in [RFC6147], if an attacker can manage to change
> the
> >>    Pref64::/n used by the DNS64 function, the traffic generated by
> the
> >>    host that receives the synthetic reply will be delivered to the
> >>    altered Pref64.  This can result in either a denial-of-service
> (DoS)
> >>    attack, a flooding attack, or an eavesdropping attack.  This
> attack
> >>    could be achieved either by altering PCP messages issued by a
> >>    legitimate PCP server or by using a fake PCP server.
> >>
> >> NEW:
> >>
> >>    As discussed in [RFC6147], if an attacker can manage to change
> the
> >>    Pref64::/n used by the DNS64 function, the traffic generated by
> the
> >>    host that receives the synthetic reply will be delivered to the
> >>    altered Pref64.  This can result in either a denial-of-service
> (DoS)
> >>    attack, a flooding attack, or a MIM (Man In The Middle) attack.
> >> This attack
> >>    could be achieved either by altering PCP messages issued by a
> >>    legitimate PCP server or by using a fake PCP server.
> >>
> >> Better?
> >
> >[SRH] Yes, but the conventional abbreviation for
> >Man In The Middle is MITM not MIM. Who knows why?!
> [Med] Fixed.
> 
> >
> >> >2) The next paragraph of the Security Considerations section
> >> >   suggests defenses to prevent the attacker from substituting
> >> >   the wrong value for Pref64::/n. However, the defense that
> >> >   is suggested (IP-based ACLs on the PCP server, client, or
> >> >   network) won't help much. Attackers can just place the
> >> >   PCP server's IP address in the source address of the fake
> >> >   PCP response packet sent by the attack.
> >>
> >> [Med] anti-spoofing filters can be used to prevent such attack.
> Ingress
> >> filters can be also enforced at boundaries of a domain to prevent
> such
> >> attack. I do think the text is still correct.
> >
> >[SRH] These countermeasures provide no defense against an attacker
> >who is on the path from the PCP server to the client. This is
> >not a theoretical attack, as described in certain news reports
> >recently (Der Spiegel).
> [Med] The deployment I have in mind is a pcp service offered by a
> service provider while pcp clients are hosted in a CPE or in connected
> devices (either behind the CPE or directly to the service provider
> network). To achieve the attack vector you described, the mis-behaving
> node should be in the service provider network or connected to that
> network. If that service provider enforced anti-spoofing filters, then
> a mis-behaving node cannot act as a fake pcp server.
> 
> I understand this is a deployment case among others. So to be accurate,
> I changed the text as follows:
> 
> OLD:
>    For example, access control lists (ACLs) can be installed on the PCP
>    client, PCP server, and the network between them, so those ACLs
> allow
>    only communications from a trusted PCP server to the PCP client.
> 
> NEW:
>    In some deployments, access control lists (ACLs) can be installed on
>    the PCP client, PCP server, and the network between them, so those
>    ACLs allow only communications from a trusted PCP server to the PCP
>    client.
> 
> 
> >
> >> > The nonce in the
> >> >   MAP or PEER response means that the attacker must capture
> >> >   or predict this value but no nonce is present in the ANNOUNCE
> >> >   response so that would probably be the preferred attack
> >> >   method, especially since ANNOUNCE responses can be sent
> >> >   out via multicast at any time. I suggest that the spec
> >> >   prohibit sending the PREFIX64 option in a multicast
> >> >   ANNOUNCE response, unless effective countermeasures for
> >> >   this attack are found.
> >> [Med] Isn't this covered by this text:
> >>
> >> "   Means to defend against attackers who can modify packets between
> >> the
> >>    PCP server and the PCP client, or who can inject spoofed packets
> >> that
> >>    appear to come from a legitimate PCP server SHOULD be enabled."
> >
> >[SRH] That would be a reasonable countermeasure if such means
> >actually existed. Could you describe what those means
> >would be? As I mentioned above, ingress filters and
> >anti-spoofing filters are ineffective against on-path
> >attackers.
> [Med] As mentioned above, ACLs are sufficient in some deployment
> contexts.
> 
> 
> >
> >> >In addition to these security issues, I found some other issues
> >> >that are not related to security:
> >> >
> >> >1) You should explain that RFC 6146 defines Pref64::/n.
> >> >   Otherwise, that term is quite cryptic.
> >> [Med] I added this new sentence:
> >>
> >>    According to [RFC6146], NAT64 uses Pref64::/n to construct
> >>    IPv4-Converted IPv6 addresses as defined in [RFC6052].
> >>
> >> Better?
> >
> >[SRH] Great!
> >
> >[SRH] Deleted several more comments that you have addressed.
> >
> >> >6) Text near the top of page 8 says "The PCP server can be
> >> >   configured with a customized IPv6 prefix list" but that
> >> >   won't work when PREFIX64 is added to a multicast ANNOUNCE
> >> >   response. That's another reason not to permit this, in
> >> >   addition to security issue 2) above.
> >> [Med] I added this sentence:
> >>
> >> " Note, it is NOT
> >>       RECOMMENDED to include PREFIX64 options in ANNOUNCE messages
> if a
> >>       customized IPv6 prefix list is configured to the PCP server. "
> >>
> >> Better?
> >
> >[SRH] Maybe. Is there some way that including PREFIX64 options in
> >ANNOUNCE messages will work if a customized IPv6 prefix list
> >is configured to the PCP server? If not, this should be a
> >MUST NOT instead of a NOT RECOMMENDED.
> 
> [Med] An example is the use of separate zones (see for instance
> http://tools.ietf.org/search/draft-penno-pcp-zones-01) or if several
> logical topologies are configured.
> 
> >
> >> >7) When IPv4 prefix lists are configured and multiple IPv6
> >> >   prefix lists are also configured, the first PREFIX64
> >> >   option includes the IPv4 prefix lists. Can the later
> >> >   PREFIX64 options also include their own IPv4 prefix
> >> >   lists? If one or more of those later PREFIX64 options
> >> >   does NOT have its own IPv4 prefix list, what does that
> >> >   mean? Does it inherit the IPv4 prefix list of the
> >> >   previous PREFIX64 option? The current text is not clear.
> >> [Med] Only the first occurrence can carry the IPv4 prefix because
> other
> >> occurrences are not used by building IPv4-converted addresses, but
> only
> >> to distinguish these addresses if received in referrals. I can add a
> >> sentence to indicate this explicitly in the text.
> >
> >[SRH] Thanks. Please do.
> [Med] I added this sentence to Section 4.1:
> 
> " When multiple PREFIX64 options are included in the same PCP message,
> only the first PREFIX64 option occurrence may include the IPv4 Prefix
> List field."
> 
> 
> >
> >> >8) The example in section 5.1 says that it "depicts a
> >> >   typical usage of the PREFIX64 option when a DNS64
> >> >   capability is embedded in the host." Did you mean
> >> >   "is not embedded"? I don't see how DNS64 is being
> >> >   used in this example.
> >>
> >> [Med] The text is correct. DNS64 is used to form locally an IPv4-
> >> converted IPv6 address. The example assumes the address of the IPv4
> >> server is retrieved using A records. DNS exchanges are not mentioned
> in
> >> the figure to avoid overloading it.
> >
> >[SRH] OK. You may want to explain this a bit more.
> [Med] I made this change:
> 
> OLD:
> "once the IPv6-only client discovers the IPv4 address of the remote
> IPv4-only server"
> 
> NEW:
> " once the IPv6-only client discovers the IPv4 address of the remote
> IPv4-only server (e.g., using DNS)"
> 
> and added this sentence:
> 
> " Note: DNS exchange to retrieve the IPv4 address of
>       the IPv4-only Server is not shown in the figure. "
> 
> >
> >> >9) Is this document still relevant? RFC 7051 says:
> >> >
> >> >   Our conclusion is to recommend publishing the Well-Known DNS
> Name
> >> >   heuristic discovery-based method as a Standards Track IETF
> document
> >> >   for applications and host implementors to implement as-is.
> >> >
> >> >   With that, is there still a need for this document?
> >> [Med] Yes, this is explicitly mentioned in the shepherded text of
> >> RFC7050. Please refer to
> >> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7050/history/
> >>
> >> "    The document specifies a heuristic that is not perfect and so
> some
> >>     points were rough, but the constraint for this document was to
> >> operate
> >>     without changes to code (only configuration) in existing
> networks.
> >>     Given that constraint, there was strong consensus.  Relaxing the
> >>     constraint would allow one to do better, and that is the focus
> of a
> >>     draft recently submitted to the PCP WG."
> >
> >[SRH] OK, fine. You might want to mention that in your draft.
> >Otherwise, other readers may have the same confusion. They're
> >not likely to read the shepherd text for RFC 7050!
> >
> 
>