Re: [secdir] review of draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-openid-06

Jeffrey Hutzelman <jhutz@cmu.edu> Thu, 03 November 2011 16:06 UTC

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From: Jeffrey Hutzelman <jhutz@cmu.edu>
Date: Thu, 03 Nov 2011 12:05:57 -0400
To: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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Cc: hmauldin@cisco.com, lear@cisco.com, secdir@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [secdir] review of draft-ietf-kitten-sasl-openid-06
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Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org> wrote:

>Perhaps the solution is to remove text rather than add more?
>
>I share Jeff's concern that adding text here may give the impression
>that it implies something different than what a SASL implementer would
>expect to follow automatically from the normative references.
>
>How about removing this sentence:
>
>       The GS2 header carries the optional authorization identity.
>
>from section 3.1 and modify the other paragraph in section 3.1 into
>
>   The syntax and semantics of the "gs2-header" is specified in
>   [RFC5801], and we use it here with the following limitations.  The
>   "gs2-nonstd-flag" MUST NOT be present.  The "gs2-cb- flag" MUST be
>   "n" because channel binding is not supported by this mechanism.
>
>The document is already clear elsewhere that the mechanism supports the
>concept of authorization identities (see beginning of section 3).
>
>The syntax and semantics of the authorization identity field is covered
>normatively by the base SASL specification and the GS2 document.

So, the reason not to do that is that we've decided (I think) that people doing pure-SASL implementations of dual-stack mechanisms such as this one should normally not have to read the GS2 spec, since it specifies a layer of abstraction that they don't care about.

OTOH, I think we can be clearer.  The new text you just proposed is a good start; we can refer to GS2 for clarification without annoying pure-SASL implementers too much.  But instead of removing references to "optional authorization identity", what if we change them to "SASL authorization identity, when used" ?  This makes it clear that an autzid might _not_ be used, provides a hint where to look to learn more about autzids (SASL), and avoids the impression that we are applying the word OPTIONAL to anything.

>/Simon