[secdir] SECDIR review of draft-ietf-roll-security-threats-01

[Stephen Kent <[e-mail]>]

SECDIR review of draft-ietf-roll-security-threats-01

I reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing 
effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.These 
comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area 
directors.Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments 
just like any other last call comments. This is a review of the revised 
version of the -00 draft that I reviewed on 1/17/13.

I am _very_ disappointed to see that essentially all of the comments 
that I made, many of which were easy to address, were ignored. Only my 
edits of typos seem to have been incorporated.

-3.3: the term sleep node is still used but not defined.

-3.4: several terms used here (misappropriated, legitimacy, and 
truthfulness) still represent poor choices of terminology, and should be 
fixed

-4.1.1: sniffing should still be replaced with passive wiretapping, 
everywhere

-4.2: the authors did not fix the definition of traffic analysis

-4.2.2: "misappropriation", again

-4.3.1: overload attack mentioned, w/o definition

-4.3.2: selective forwarding, wormhole and sinkhole attacks are 
mentioned, w/o definitions, still

-5.1.1: still incorrect assertions re countering deliberate exposure, 
i.e., no mention of authorization

-5.1.2: device compromise is not usually considered as part of passive 
wiretapping attacks

-5.1.3: TA still mischaracterized as "may be passive"

-5.1.4: I suggested that anti-tamper should be out of scope for this 
document

-5.2.2: a trivial, brief discussion that is not helpful

-5.2.3: still an oversimplified symmetric vs. asymmetric cryptographic 
discussion, and the authors did not update the text to a more recent 
cite that I provided

I have chosen to not continue because it appears that NONE of the 
specific comments I made have been addressed, based on a quick look at 
the -00 vs. -01 diff file.