Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs

Stephen Kent <> Tue, 03 May 2011 19:36 UTC

Return-Path: <>
Received: from localhost (localhost []) by (Postfix) with ESMTP id 65380E0863; Tue, 3 May 2011 12:36:35 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -104.878
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-104.878 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=1.721, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED=-4, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from ([]) by localhost ( []) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id WeFLCisf3HwZ; Tue, 3 May 2011 12:36:35 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from ( []) by (Postfix) with ESMTP id E1F42E066E; Tue, 3 May 2011 12:36:34 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from ([]:60540 helo=[]) by with esmtp (Exim 4.74 (FreeBSD)) (envelope-from <>) id 1QHLOQ-00026p-Pp; Tue, 03 May 2011 15:36:25 -0400
Mime-Version: 1.0
Message-Id: <p06240800c9e604898d1c@[]>
In-Reply-To: <>
References: <> <> <> <> <> <p06240801c9ce424e70b1@[]> <> <p06240808c9e45144c8f9@[]> <>
Date: Tue, 03 May 2011 15:16:28 -0400
To: Sam Hartman <>
From: Stephen Kent <>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format="flowed"
Cc:, Sam Hartman <>,,
Subject: Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-sidr-res-certs
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: Security Area Directorate <>
List-Unsubscribe: <>, <>
List-Archive: <>
List-Post: <>
List-Help: <>
List-Subscribe: <>, <>
X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 03 May 2011 19:36:35 -0000

At 11:05 AM -0400 5/3/11, Sam Hartman wrote:
>Let me make sure I'm understanding what you're saying.  I can have
>multiple ROAs for the same set of prefixes in the repository and valid
>at the same time: one signed by a new certificate and one signed by a
>previous certificate?  If so, I think I now begin to understand why the
>SIDR working group believes this is a reasonable strategy.

yes, that is correct.  This is an essential part of the alg transition

>I guess the only question I'd have remaining is whether ROAs or other
>signed objects are intended to be used in other protocols besides simply
>living in the SIDR repository?

The RPKI repository is designed to support a specific, narrow set of
apps. That's what the CP says, and we try to make these certs unattractive
for other apps, e.g., by use of the non-meaningful names.