Re: [secdir] New Routing Area Security Design Team

[Richard Barnes <[e-mail]>]

On Sun, Apr 15, 2018 at 3:27 PM, Jeffrey Haas <[e-mail]> wrote:

>
> > On Apr 15, 2018, at 2:04 PM, Russ White <[e-mail]> wrote:
> >
> >
> >> As Richard said, the headline issue for outsiders like me is BGP
> hijacking,
> >> whether as a mean to hijack addresses and inject spam, or as a way to
> >
> > This is more about documenting how routing folks should build their
> security considerations sections to reduce the friction between the
> security area and the routing area. A much more prosaic situation, I
> know... 😊
>
> ^This.
>
>
> >
> > If you'd like to chat about the BGP hijack problem, ping me. It's not
> something I'm interested in trying to "solve" in the context of the IETF
> any longer, for various reasons.
>
> Right.  Please save this bit of ocean boiling for elsewhere. Like over
> beer.
>

Part of the problem here is that the routing community seems to regard
these issues as separate.

Security analysis happens in the context of a threat model -- what is the
valuable thing you're protecting, and what are you protecting it from?  If
you want to say you're talking about routing security, you need to either
address the whole spectrum of threats (not just, say, local threats due to
poorly protected transport), or have some plausible story for why certain
threats should be out of scope.  What Christian and I are saying is that
BGP manipulation is an active, major threat to the Internet, so it seems
odd to us to rule it out of scope.

"Ocean boiling" is part of the IETF's job description.  We made the ocean,
and if it's the wrong temperature, it's our fault.

And it's not impossible.  HTTPS usage has gone from <30% to >70% in less
than five years [1].  Even IPv6 is in the range of 20% now [2].

--Richard


[1] https://letsencrypt.org/stats/
[2] https://www.google.com/intl/en/ipv6/statistics.html