Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-mip4-generic-notification-message-09
Jari Arkko <jari.arkko@piuha.net> Tue, 08 September 2009 06:11 UTC
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Date: Tue, 08 Sep 2009 09:11:42 +0300
From: Jari Arkko <jari.arkko@piuha.net>
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To: "Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey@cisco.com>
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Cc: mip4-chairs@tools.ietf.org, draft-ietf-mip4-generic-notification-message@tools.ietf.org, iesg@ietf.org, secdir@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-mip4-generic-notification-message-09
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Thanks for your review! Authors, do you have suggested text edits and/or a new draft version to address these? Jari Joseph Salowey (jsalowey) wrote: > have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's > ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. > These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security > area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these > comments just like any other last call comments. > > I have primarily focused on the security considerations section in this > document. I also quickly reviewed the rest of the document. Based on > my review I have the following comments: > > 1. In section 4.1, Identification > > It states "nonces" are optional. Nonces are not mentioned in the rest > of the document. This option should be removed. > > 2. Section 4.1, extensions > > I found this section confusing as to when the AE is required. It seems > the document states that the AE is always required, however it also uses > optional. For example its not clear to me what is required in the case > given is section 3.2. > > 3. Section 4.2, extensions > > Shouldn't the AE be required for GNAM? > > 4. Security considerations Section 8 > > It also wasn't quite clear to me when the AE is optional and mandatory. > > > 5. Section 8.1 > > There are several places in the document where different replay > mechanisms are alluded to, included this section. This section states > that nodes must agree on the mechanism used. However there appears to > be no way to signal what mechanism is in use. Is this assumed to be > pre-configured in each node, or is there another mechanism for this? Is > this realistic for deployments? > > 6. Section 8.1.1 > > NTP RFC 1305 needs to be included in the normative references. > > Why is it important "those bits which are not available from a time > source SHOULD be generated from a good source of randomness" ? (it seems > that you don't really want bits to be random since you want to enforce > ordering) > > This section also talks very briefly about clock synchronization. It > seems there could be security implications here. One node may be able > to poison a clock to an in appropriate value. There probably should be > more discussion here. > > 7. Section 8.2 > > This section makes a statement but does not describe how impacts the > security of the system. Since authentication is not performed can you > use the extension defined in the document in this case? What is the > effect of the lack of authentication. > >
- [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-mip4-generic… Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
- Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-mip4-gen… Jari Arkko
- Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-mip4-gen… Hui Deng