Re: [secdir] SecDir review of draft-ietf-ospf-ospfv3-autoconfig

"Acee Lindem (acee)" <acee@cisco.com> Wed, 14 January 2015 02:08 UTC

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From: "Acee Lindem (acee)" <acee@cisco.com>
To: "Adam W. Montville" <adam.w.montville@gmail.com>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, "secdir@ietf.org" <secdir@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-ospf-ospfv3-autoconfig.all@tools.ietf.org" <draft-ietf-ospf-ospfv3-autoconfig.all@tools.ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: SecDir review of draft-ietf-ospf-ospfv3-autoconfig
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Date: Wed, 14 Jan 2015 02:07:54 +0000
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Subject: Re: [secdir] SecDir review of draft-ietf-ospf-ospfv3-autoconfig
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Hi Adam, 
Here are the updates I’m proposing to address your comments:

*** 180,185 ****
--- 180,188 ----
     Thanks to Martin Vigoureux for Routing Area Directorate review and
     comments.
  
+    Thanks to Adam Montville for Security Area Directorate review and
+    comments.
+
     Special thanks go to Markus Stenberg for his implementation of this
     specification in Bird.
  
***************

*** 451,464 ****

5.  OSPFv3 Router ID Selection

!    An OSPFv3 router requires a unique Router ID for correct protocol
!    operation.  An OSPFv3 router implementing this specification will
!    select a router-id that has a high probability of uniqueness.  A
!    pseudo-random number SHOULD be used for the OSPFv3 Router ID.  The
!    generation should be seeded with a variable that is likely to be
!    unique in the applicable OSPFv3 router deployment.  A good choice of
!    seed would be some portion or hash of the Router-Hardware-Fingerprint
!    as described in Section 7.2.2.

    Since there is a possibility of a Router ID collision, duplicate
    Router ID detection and resolution are required as described in
--- 451,465 ----

5.  OSPFv3 Router ID Selection

!    An OSPFv3 router requires a unique Router ID within the OSPFv3
!    routing domain for correct protocol operation.  An OSPFv3 router
!    implementing this specification will select a router-id that has a
!    high probability of uniqueness.  A pseudo-random number SHOULD be
!    used for the OSPFv3 Router ID.  The generation SHOULD be seeded with
!    a variable that is likely to be unique in the applicable OSPFv3
!    router deployment.  A good choice of seed would be some portion or
!    hash of the Router-Hardware-Fingerprint as described in
!    Section 7.2.2.

    Since there is a possibility of a Router ID collision, duplicate
    Router ID detection and resolution are required as described in
***************

*** 799,810 ****
    automatic pairing between devices.  These mechanisms can help provide
    an automatically configured, securely routed network.

!
!
!
!
!
!



--- 799,810 ----
    automatic pairing between devices.  These mechanisms can help provide
    an automatically configured, securely routed network.

!    In deployments where stronger authentification or encryption is
!    required, OSPFv3 IPsec [OSPFV3-IPSEC] or stronger OSPFv3
!    Authentication trailer [OSPFV3-AUTH-TRAILER] algorithms MAY be used
!    at the expense of additional configuration.  The configuration and
!    operational description of such deployments is beyond the scope of
!    this document.



***************


Thanks,
Acee 

On 1/13/15, 8:14 PM, "Acee Lindem (acee)" <acee@cisco.com> wrote:

>Hi Adam, 
>
>On 1/13/15, 12:26 PM, "Adam W. Montville" <adam.w.montville@gmail.com>
>wrote:
>
>>I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
>>ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.
>>These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security
>>area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these
>>comments just like any other last call comments.
>>
>>This draft is ready with comments/nits.
>>
>>Comments
>>The document describes necessary mechanisms for OSPFv3 to be
>>self-configuring in environments requiring such (e.g. IPv6 home
>>networks).
>>
>>A couple of things stood out to me.  First, I inferred from the document
>>that the uniqueness of Router IDs is so within the context of the present
>>deployment and not, for example, unique between domains.  This may be
>>common knowledge in the world of OSPF, but wasn¹t to me (at least not
>>initially).  It could be good to add a sentence about the context of
>>Router ID uniqueness early on in the document.
>
>I will add a statement to section 5.
>
>>
>>Also regarding uniqueness of the ID, Section 5, ³OSPFv3 Router ID
>>Selection², indicates that a pseudo-random number SHOULD be used to
>>derive the Router ID.  Later in that first paragraph: ³The generation
>>should be seeded with a variable that is likely to be unique in the
>>applicable OSPFv3 router deployment.²  Should that ³should² be ³SHOULD²?
>
>Yes - these two sentences definitely SHOULD be consistent.
>
>>
>>The document clearly recognizes the possibility for Router ID collisions,
>>and there does not appear to be a need for a cryptographically sound
>>pseudo-random number generation - just enough entropy to make the Router
>>ID unique within the deployment domain, and the
>>Router-Hardware-Fingerprint TLV (Section 7.2.2) is presented as being
>>enough.
>
>Do you feel that a statement with respect to the pseudo-random algorithm
>is necessary? If so, can you suggest some text?
>
>
>>
>>Because this document essentially explains the OSPFv3 defaults a router
>>should have in order to support auto-configuration, I presumed that the
>>security considerations provided in previous OSPFv3 documents would
>>essentially be in effect here.  This isn¹t explicitly stated in the
>>Security Considerations section, but could be without harm, should they
>>apply here.  The bottom line for me is that it seems that OSPFv3
>>auto-configuration favors usability over security, but without ignoring
>>security entirely (e.g. ³auto-configuration can also be combined with
>>password configuration or future extensions for automatic pairing between
>>devices.²).
>
>I agree with the above except that the document doesn't address all the
>available OSPFv3 security options. Let me add a paragraph.
>
>I will provide some updated text for review prior to republishing.
>
>Thanks,
>Acee 
>
>