Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-ippm-model-based-metrics-10

[Matt Mathis <[e-mail]>]

(Dropping iesg from the follow up chatter).

I am adding a paragraph to the security section:
      <t>Note that in situ measurements sometimes require sending
      synthetic measurement traffic between arbitrary locations in the
      network, and as such are potentially attractive platforms for
      launching DDOS attacks.  All active measurement tools and
      protocols must be deigned to minimize the opportunities for
      these misuses.</t>

Thanks for the feedback!

Thanks,
--MM--
The best way to predict the future is to create it.  - Alan Kay

Privacy matters!  We know from recent events that people are using our
services to speak in defiance of unjust governments.   We treat privacy and
security as matters of life and death, because for some users, they are.

On Sun, Mar 12, 2017 at 2:14 PM, David Mandelberg <[e-mail]>
wrote:

> Hi,
>
> I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
> ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the
> IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the
> security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat
> these comments just like any other last call comments.
>
> This experimental draft "provides a framework for designing suites of IP
> diagnostic tests" to measure a network path's bulk transport capacity.
>
> As mentioned in the security considerations, actual attempts at
> measurement might be subject to manipulation by an attacker. As I
> understand it, the framework in this document neither attempts to
> prevent such attacks, nor makes them any more likely.
>
> The only other relevant potential security issue I could think of is
> whether measurement system(s) using this framework could be co-opted by
> an attacker to cause a denial of service to a specific network path. I
> think this would depend entirely on the implementation of a system
> designed using the framework in this document, and is therefore pretty
> far removed from this document itself. An attack like this also might
> not be possible because of some part of the framework that I missed. So
> I'll trust the authors' and/or working group's judgment on what to do
> with this comment.
>
> I think this draft is somewhere between (inclusive) Ready and Ready With
> Issues, depending on how far off-base my point about denial of service
> is. I'm leaning towards Ready.
>
> --
> David Eric Mandelberg / dseomn
> http://david.mandelberg.org/
>
>