Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-baker-ietf-core-03.txt
Fred Baker <fred@cisco.com> Sat, 21 November 2009 21:06 UTC
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From: Fred Baker <fred@cisco.com>
To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>, "Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@cs.columbia.edu>, Charlie Kaufman <charliek@microsoft.com>
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Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2009 06:05:57 +0900
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Subject: Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-baker-ietf-core-03.txt
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Hmm. I wonder of one of the directorate members would like to suggest better text for the section? I don't claim any expertise on that topic. On Nov 22, 2009, at 5:42 AM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote: > You can however do CMS without S/MIME. > > I agree that we should regard S/MIME as an extension to MIME. But the > origin was really to take the RSA developed PKCS#7 technology and > apply it to MIME. There really isn't much of a link there to the PEM > work. The IETF attempt to resurrect PEM in MIME was MOSS. > > > The problem here is trying to cram everything into a layered model in > the OSI style. These attempts always fail because the IETF protocols > are not a layered architecture. It is much more like a web of modules > that expose interfaces to other co-operating modules. While there is a > rough conceptual organization according to the degree of abstraction, > this is not the only organization present and it is nowhere near as > rigid as in the OSI model. > > The point about S/MIME being protection of data at rest is a critical > one. We do in fact have a security layer for SMTP - TLS. More mail is > secured using TLS than any other mail encryption protocol. > > The point being that smart grid is not an opportunity for the IETF to > roll out the architecture that they would have liked to have developed > rather than the one that did develop. Some of the differences can be > explained by path dependence, but quite a few can be explained by the > market having made the better choice. > > > On Sat, Nov 21, 2009 at 12:03 PM, Steven Bellovin > <smb@cs.columbia.edu> wrote: >> >> On Nov 20, 2009, at 11:41 PM, Charlie Kaufman wrote: >> >>> >>> Section 3.1.4: I’d be surprised if S/MIME was originally an >>> extension to SMTP. Even when S/MIME was PEM, it was largely >>> transport independent (and designed to pass over X.400, which was >>> a contender in those days). S/MIME – and more generally CMS – is >>> not really a networking protocol at all. It is designed to protect >>> data at rest. I can take a CMS protected file and send the pile of >>> bits to you by floppy disk or paper tape. Years later, if you can >>> still read the media, you can still process it. It’s a tough call >>> whether it is an Internet Core Protocol. It’s certainly an >>> important IETF protocol. >> >> That section is incorrect in several respects, in my opinion. >> First, S/MIME doesn't protect "SMTP Mail", in my opinion, since to >> me "SMTP" is referring to the 821/2821/5321 parts of the protocol. >> S/MIME is more for the 822/2822/5322 parts. More precisely, S/MIME >> is a way to put in security at the MIME layer (references omitted), >> which in turn extend 822/2822/5322. The distinction is important >> because HTTP uses MIME but not SMTP. (It could have used S/MIME, >> but that's a separate wistful thread.) Second, it's an interesting >> question if CMS should be mentioned separately -- you can't do S/ >> MIME without CMS. >> >> >> --Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb >> >> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> secdir mailing list >> secdir@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/secdir >> > > > > -- > -- > New Website: http://hallambaker.com/ > View Quantum of Stupid podcasts, Tuesday and Thursday each week, > http://quantumofstupid.com/
- Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-baker-ietf-co… Steven Bellovin
- [secdir] Secdir review of draft-baker-ietf-core-0… Charlie Kaufman
- Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-baker-ietf-co… Fred Baker
- Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-baker-ietf-co… Steven Bellovin
- Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-baker-ietf-co… Phillip Hallam-Baker
- Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-baker-ietf-co… Fred Baker
- Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-baker-ietf-co… Paul Hoffman