Re: [secdir] Review of draft-ietf-ipsecme-traffic-visibility-11

Gabriel Montenegro <gmonte@microsoft.com> Wed, 09 December 2009 16:40 UTC

Return-Path: <gmonte@microsoft.com>
X-Original-To: secdir@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: secdir@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 85C1C3A68C6 for <secdir@core3.amsl.com>; Wed, 9 Dec 2009 08:40:43 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -10.432
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-10.432 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.167, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id WjAFRJzo9l7T for <secdir@core3.amsl.com>; Wed, 9 Dec 2009 08:40:42 -0800 (PST)
Received: from smtp.microsoft.com (maila.microsoft.com [131.107.115.212]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id AA8C43A6AFA for <secdir@ietf.org>; Wed, 9 Dec 2009 08:40:42 -0800 (PST)
Received: from TK5EX14MLTC104.redmond.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.79.159) by TK5-EXGWY-E801.partners.extranet.microsoft.com (10.251.56.50) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 8.2.176.0; Wed, 9 Dec 2009 08:40:31 -0800
Received: from TK5EX14MLTW651.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com (157.54.71.39) by TK5EX14MLTC104.redmond.corp.microsoft.com (157.54.79.159) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.0.639.20; Wed, 9 Dec 2009 08:40:31 -0800
Received: from TK5EX14MBXW652.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com ([169.254.2.203]) by TK5EX14MLTW651.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com ([157.54.71.39]) with mapi; Wed, 9 Dec 2009 08:40:23 -0800
From: Gabriel Montenegro <gmonte@microsoft.com>
To: Sean Turner <turners@ieca.com>, secdir <secdir@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-ipsecme-traffic-visibility.all@tools.ietf.org" <draft-ietf-ipsecme-traffic-visibility.all@tools.ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: Review of draft-ietf-ipsecme-traffic-visibility-11
Thread-Index: AQHKeGbnOkwDTlf2mUWHcb7VNERg/pFc6Iow
Date: Wed, 9 Dec 2009 16:40:22 +0000
Message-ID: <17CBED0797974641B6FF531FCB74E0931B5A9376@TK5EX14MBXW652.wingroup.windeploy.ntdev.microsoft.com>
References: <4B1EE71E.1040704@ieca.com>
In-Reply-To: <4B1EE71E.1040704@ieca.com>
Accept-Language: en-US
Content-Language: en-US
X-MS-Has-Attach:
X-MS-TNEF-Correlator:
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Mailman-Approved-At: Wed, 09 Dec 2009 08:49:28 -0800
Subject: Re: [secdir] Review of draft-ietf-ipsecme-traffic-visibility-11
X-BeenThere: secdir@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
List-Id: Security Area Directorate <secdir.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/secdir>, <mailto:secdir-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/secdir>
List-Post: <mailto:secdir@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:secdir-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/secdir>, <mailto:secdir-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 09 Dec 2009 16:40:43 -0000

Hi Sean, thanks for the review.

As you noted, the WG decided not to use AH as NATs are unavoidable and a fact of life. Not sure if there were many other reasons, but this one seems to be a show-stopper if one wants to deploy this in any real scenario. 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Sean Turner [mailto:turners@ieca.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, 08 December, 2009 3:54 PM
> To: secdir; draft-ietf-ipsecme-traffic-visibility.all@tools.ietf.org
> Subject: Review of draft-ietf-ipsecme-traffic-visibility-11
> 
> I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
> ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.
> These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area
> directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just
> like any other last call comments.
> 
> Document Abstract:
> 
> This document describes the Wrapped Encapsulating Security Payload
> (WESP) protocol, which builds on the Encapsulating Security Payload
> (ESP) [RFC4303], and is designed to allow intermediate devices to (1)
> ascertain if data confidentiality is being employed within ESP and if not,
> (2) inspect the IPsec packets for network monitoring and access control
> functions.
> 
> I don't have any comments on the technical contents of the ID.
> 
> But, I do have a comment w.r.t. the approach.*  It seems to me that what
> you're looking for is an indication early on that the coming packets are
> encrypted or not.  Don't we already have that with the 50/51 value in the
> protocol header (IPv4, IPv6, or Extension) immediately preceding the
> ESP/AH header.  Why don't we use that as the indication, prohibit those
> NULL encryption algorithms, and then we're done?  We don't have to worry
> about implementing this protocol, the heuristics algorithm in the other I-
> D, and we don't have to complicate the adoption of ESP/AH?
> 
> spt
> 
> * The only rationale I saw was in the 3rd paragraph of the introduction
> that says AH doesn't work in NAT environments.  Is that really the entire
> reason?  I thought we were trying to kill NATS?