Re: [secdir] Review of draft-ietf-pce-lsp-control-request-07

Shawn Emery <shawn.emery@gmail.com> Sun, 25 August 2019 19:17 UTC

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From: Shawn Emery <shawn.emery@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 25 Aug 2019 13:17:39 -0600
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To: Mahend Negi <mahend.ietf@gmail.com>
Cc: secdir <secdir@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-pce-lsp-control-request.all@ietf.org, pce@ietf.org, Dhruv Dhody <dhruv.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [secdir] Review of draft-ietf-pce-lsp-control-request-07
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The changes look good.  Thank you for the follow-up.

Shawn.
--

On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 11:13 AM Mahend Negi <mahend.ietf@gmail.com>; wrote:

> Hi Shawn/Dhruv,
>
> Thanks for the review and clarifications, we have fixed all the editorial
> comments in new version.
>
> New Version:
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-pce-lsp-control-request-08
>
> Version Diff:
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-pce-lsp-control-request-08
>
> Regards,
> Mahendra
>
>
> On Tue, Aug 20, 2019 at 11:14 AM Dhruv Dhody <dhruv.ietf@gmail.com>; wrote:
>
>> Hi Shawn,
>>
>> <adding WG>
>>
>> Thanks for your security review and comments.
>>
>> On Mon, Aug 19, 2019 at 6:17 AM Shawn Emery <shawn.emery@gmail.com>;
>> wrote:
>> >
>> > Reviewer: Shawn M. Emery
>> > Review result: Ready
>> >
>> > I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
>> > ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.
>> > These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security
>> > area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these
>> > comments just like any other last call comments.
>> >
>> > This draft specifies an extension to the Path Computation Element
>> communication
>> > Protocol (PCE) that allows a PCE to request control of Label Switched
>> Paths (LSPs).
>> >
>> > The security considerations section does exist and discusses a new DoS
>> vector
>> > that this draft creates.  The attack involves sending control requests
>> for delegate
>> > control of all of its LSPs to the Path Computation Client (PCC).  The
>> proposed
>> > solution is to set a threshold rate of the delegation requests for the
>> PCC per PCE.
>> > I agree with the proposed solution, though I don't know if guidance can
>> be provided
>> > on what these thresholds would be per environment.
>> >
>>
>> As you noted the document does not provide default for the threshold
>> as it dependent on the deployment/environment. The same is true for
>> RFC 8231.
>>
>> > The section goes on to refer to RFC 8231 to justify that the PCP
>> extension should
>> > be deployed with authenticated and encrypted sessions in TLS using RFC
>> 8253.
>> > I agree with this prescription as well else an attacker would now be
>> able to take
>> > control over all local LSPs with this extension.  I think that this
>> should at least be
>> > stated if an attacker is able to compromise a PCE.
>> >
>>
>> The security consideration includes "...either by spoofing messages or
>> by compromising the PCE itself".
>>
>> > General comments:
>> >
>> > None.
>> >
>> > Editorial comments:
>> >
>> > s/sends PCRpt/sends a PCRpt/
>> > s/also specify/also specifies/
>> > s/all its/all of its/
>> > s/If threshold/If the threshold/
>> > s/explicitly set aside/explicitly excluded/
>> >
>>
>> Thanks for these, request authors to handle them.
>>
>> Thanks!
>> Dhruv
>>
>> > Shawn.
>> > --
>>
>