[secdir] another TA observation

Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Tue, 15 June 2010 22:19 UTC

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Date: Tue, 15 Jun 2010 18:19:35 -0400
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From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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Subject: [secdir] another TA observation
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In explaining the differences between the new TA proposal and the 
compound TA proposal to a staff member, I realized that there is 
another (perhaps minor) difference that I failed to include in my 
analysis last week.

The new (simple) TA proposal requires each RP to fetch the trust 
anchor (the self-signed cert) to make sure that the RP has the 
current version re the 3779 resources contained therein. I don't 
recall that Sam's I-D specified how frequently an RP should (SHOULD?) 
perform this fetch. The simple, safe answer might be to perform the 
fetch every time the RP does a tree walk to gather new certs, CRLs, 

In the compound TA mode the ETA is constant for a very long period 
(indicated by the validity interval in the self-signed cert). The CMS 
blob that contains the RTA is fetched (presumably as part of the tree 
walk), and verified using the (single-use?) EE cert contained in the 
blob, to obtain the up-to-date TA for RPKI cert validation.

Not sure if anyone cares about this difference, but I thought I would 
mention it for completeness.