Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-dhc-pd-exclude-04
Magnus Nyström <magnusn@gmail.com> Thu, 09 February 2012 07:38 UTC
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Date: Wed, 08 Feb 2012 23:38:32 -0800
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From: Magnus Nyström <magnusn@gmail.com>
To: jouni korhonen <jouni.nospam@gmail.com>
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Cc: draft-ietf-dhc-pd-exclude@tools.ietf.org, iesg@ietf.org, secdir@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-dhc-pd-exclude-04
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Thanks Jouni; the text in RFC 3633 looks great. Maybe you could update the security considerations section in your draft to say (add after current last sentence): "In particular, RFC 3633 provides recommendations for protection against prefix delegation attacks. This specification does not add any new security considerations beyond those provided by RFC 3633." ? This way, the reader will immediately know that it is covered by 3633. -- Magnus On Wed, Feb 8, 2012 at 11:24 PM, jouni korhonen <jouni.nospam@gmail.com> wrote: > > Magnus, > > Thank you for your review. Regarding the authentication of the excluded > prefix. I admit the security considerations text is thin but, for example, > RFC3633 security considerations that we refer to already says: > > To guard against attacks through prefix delegation, requesting > routers and delegating routers SHOULD use DHCP authentication as > described in section 21, "Authentication of DHCP messages" of RFC > 3315. For point to point links, where one trusts that there is no > man in the middle, or one trusts layer two authentication, DHCP > authentication or IPsec may not be necessary. Because a requesting > > We did not come up with anything more specific that should be added. > Does the above address your concern regarding excluded prefix authentication? > > We can add a sentence to the Security considerations saying: > > "This specification does not add any new security considerations > in addition to those already discussed in RFC3315 and RFC3633." > > > - Jouni > > > On Feb 9, 2012, at 8:43 AM, Magnus Nyström wrote: > >> I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's >> ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the >> IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the >> security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat >> these comments just like any other last call comments. >> >> This document defines a method for DHCPv6 routers to exclude a prefix >> out of a delegated set of prefixes. >> >> I have no comments on the document itself but the Security >> Considerations section is very terse. If the method in this draft does >> not introduce any new security considerations beyond those already >> present in RFC 3315 or RFC 3633 then it should at least say so. It >> appears to me however that something could be said about >> authenticating the request to exclude a particular prefix? >> >> -- Magnus > -- -- Magnus
- [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-dhc-pd-exclu… Magnus Nyström
- Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-dhc-pd-e… jouni korhonen
- Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-dhc-pd-e… Magnus Nyström
- Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-dhc-pd-e… jouni korhonen