Re: [secdir] [Last-Call] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-opsawg-l3sm-l3nm-10

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Tue, 03 August 2021 04:21 UTC

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Date: Mon, 2 Aug 2021 21:21:02 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: tom petch <daedulus@btconnect.com>
Cc: Rifaat Shekh-Yusef <rifaat.s.ietf@gmail.com>, secdir@ietf.org, last-call@ietf.org, draft-ietf-opsawg-l3sm-l3nm.all@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [secdir] [Last-Call] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-opsawg-l3sm-l3nm-10
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Hi Tom,

On Thu, Jul 29, 2021 at 05:10:00PM +0100, tom petch wrote:
> Reading this I-D, I wondered what the secdir view is of recommending the 
> use of MD5 to secure the session as this I-D does for BGP.  (Such a use 
> in NTP did generate a comment).

This part:

      'authentication':  The module adheres to the recommendations in
         Section 13.2 of [RFC4364] as it allows enabling TCP-AO
         [RFC5925] and accommodates the installed base that makes use of
         MD5.  In addition, the module includes a provision for the use

seems to be about as good as we can do given the current state of
deployment and implementation.

I will probably suggest adding some additional discussion of the weakness
of MD5 to the security considerations in my ballot comments, if no such
text appears before then.

Thanks,

Ben