Re: [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-core-dev-urn-08
Brian Weis <bew.stds@gmail.com> Thu, 03 December 2020 20:04 UTC
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From: Brian Weis <bew.stds@gmail.com>
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Date: Thu, 03 Dec 2020 12:04:01 -0800
References: <160702546541.14061.15940689920006174458@ietfa.amsl.com>
To: secdir@ietf.org, last-call@ietf.org, draft-ietf-core-dev-urn.all@ietf.org, core@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-core-dev-urn-08
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Oops: this review is marked “Serious Issues”, where (as mentioned in the comments) I intended it to be “Ready with nits”. Sorry for the confusion. Brian > On Dec 3, 2020, at 11:57 AM, Brian Weis via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> wrote: > > Reviewer: Brian Weis > Review result: Serious Issues > > I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's > ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the > IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the > security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should > treat these comments just like any other last call comments. > > The summary of the review is Ready with nits. > > This document generally defines a new URN namespace for hardware > device identifiers, and then further defines the URN body layout > for several types of devices, where devices are identified by a > global identity (e.g., a MAC address, organizational-specific serial > number, etc.). > > Long-term identifiers have privacy considerations, and these are > well documented here. > > Here are some things that ought to be thought about: > > (1) The Security Considerations section seems to focus on concerns > around devices not allowing the device identifiers to be modified, > and gives rather broad advice about a DEV URN implementation > faithfully representing the device. It would be good for this section > to also warn implementors of the risks of a DEV URN being transmitted > without integrity protection. That is, if the device faithfully > represents itself, a man in the middle changing the DEV URN in a > protocol may cause the system using the device to not manage the > device properly, or in some manner inappropriately adjust the privileges > allowed by the device within that system. > > (2) Section 1 says about privacy “Note that long-term stable unique > identifiers are problematic for privacy reasons and should be used > with care or avoided as described in [RFC7721].” Given the later > guidance that “The DEV URN type SHOULD only be used for persistent > identifiers”, I think the “or avoided” portion of that sentence is > inappropriate for this document. > > (3) Section 5 begins with “The following three examples provide > examples of MAC-based, 1-Wire, and Cryptographic identifiers”. There > are now more than three examples provided (thanks for that!), and > it appears that cryptographic identifiers have ben removed in an > earlier draft. > > > _______________________________________________ > secdir mailing list > secdir@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/secdir > wiki: http://tools.ietf.org/area/sec/trac/wiki/SecDirReview
- [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-co… Brian Weis via Datatracker
- Re: [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-iet… Brian Weis
- Re: [secdir] [Last-Call] Secdir last call review … Jari Arkko
- Re: [secdir] [Last-Call] Secdir last call review … Carsten Bormann
- Re: [secdir] [Last-Call] Secdir last call review … Jari Arkko
- Re: [secdir] [Last-Call] Secdir last call review … Carsten Bormann