[secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-trill-oam-req

Tobias Gondrom <tobias.gondrom@gondrom.org> Tue, 01 January 2013 09:01 UTC

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Date: Tue, 01 Jan 2013 17:01:31 +0800
From: Tobias Gondrom <tobias.gondrom@gondrom.org>
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Subject: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-trill-oam-req
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I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's 
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. 
These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security 
area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these 
comments ust like any other last call comments.

This ID is informational and specifies requirements for operations, 
administration and maintenance (OAM) in TRILL (Transparent 
Interconnection of Lots of Links).

The document lists requirements from an operational perspective. And 
less from a security perspective.
Section "4.8. Security and Operational considerations" is very brief.
And although I like the basic attitude of the first sentence there 
"Methods MUST be provided to protect against exploitation of OAM 
framework for security and denial of service attacks."
The section is not clear about which requirements might derive from the 
"protect against exploitation of OAM ...for security...". The draft 
could benefit from deriving from this security consideration statement a 
set of clear and specific requirements for OAM for TRILL and/or linking 
them to the operational requirements listed in the previous sections.

Section 5 is just a pointer to section 4.8 and could be merged with 
section 4.8 and/or removed.
It is reasonable to refer to the basic security considerations for TRILL 
in RFC6325, but it would be good to add/think about requirement 
implications from security requirements for OAM.

Best regards, Tobias