[secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-opsawg-9092-update-09

Tim Hollebeek via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> Fri, 26 January 2024 21:26 UTC

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Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2024 13:26:39 -0800
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Subject: [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-opsawg-9092-update-09
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Reviewer: Tim Hollebeek
Review result: Has Nits

The document is extremely well written ... I didn't find too much to comment
on, despite looking pretty closely at the key management and signing aspects.

I just have two nits:

(1) The following paragraph appears twice in the document (looks like just a
copy/paste error when moving stuff around):

"Identifying the private key associated with the certificate and
   getting the department that controls the private key (which might be
   stored in a Hardware Security Module (HSM)) to generate the CMS
   signature is left as an exercise for the implementor.  On the other
   hand, verifying the signature has no similar complexity; the
   certificate, which is validated in the public RPKI, contains the
   needed public key."

(2) Section 6, paragraph 5: is this intended to be a RFC 2119 "MAY"?  If so,
capitalize.  If not, avoid the word.