Re: [secdir] secdir review draft-ietf-teas-p2mp-loose-path-reopt-08

["Rakesh Gandhi (rgandhi)" <[e-mail]>]

Hi Leif,

Thank you for the review of the document. 

RFC 4736 (basis for this document), Security Section 9, has coverage for this aspect – “Furthermore, a head-end LSR may decide to ignore explicit notification coming from a mid-point residing in another domain.”

Thanks,
Rakesh


On 2017-02-10, 2:30 AM, "Leif Johansson" <[e-mail]> wrote:

    
    Reviewer: Leif Johansson
    Review result: Minor issues
    
    I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
    ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the
    IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the
    security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat
    these comments just like any other last call comments.
    
    The draft describes a way to handle groupings of large sets of sub-
    LSPs in a P2MP GMPLS setup for the purpose of traffic engineering
    (re-)optimization by introducing the concept of "fragment identifiers"
    
    Let me state up front that the topic is outside my normal area of
    expertise. My only question is this: could an attacker fake messages
    that would (to the receiver ingress node) appear to be part of a
    fragmented group of sub-LSPs so as to trigger a full re-computation
    of the tree? The text in the last but one paragraph of 4.2 would
    seem to suggest that this attack is a possibility. At "worst" this
    would be a denial-of-service attack but it should perhaps be addressed
    in the security considerations section anyway.
    	
    	Cheers Leif