[secdir] SECDIR review of draft-ietf-ccamp-path-key-ero-03
Chris Lonvick <clonvick@cisco.com> Mon, 02 February 2009 21:16 UTC
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Date: Mon, 02 Feb 2009 13:16:16 -0800
From: Chris Lonvick <clonvick@cisco.com>
To: iesg@ietf.org, secdir@ietf.org, jpv@cisco.com, Rich Bradford <rbradfor@cisco.com>, adrian@olddog.co.uk, Deborah Brungard <dbrungard@att.com>
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Subject: [secdir] SECDIR review of draft-ietf-ccamp-path-key-ero-03
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Hi, I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call comments. Overall, the document appears to be well written and comprehensive and I have no problem with it proceeding to become an RFC. I do have one editorial comment. In Section 4, Security Considerations, the following bullet appears. === - Authenticity of the path key. A concern is that the path key in the PKS will be altered or faked leading to erroneous path key expansion and the use of the wrong CPS. The consequence would be a bad ERO in a Path message causing the LSP to be set up incorrectly resulting in incorrect network resource usage, diversion of traffic to where it can be intercepted, or failure to set up the LSP. These problems can be prevented by protecting the protocol exchanges in PCEP and RSVP-TE using standard security techniques. === I feel that the term "standard security techniques" is too vague for a standards track document and would ask you to rephrase the last sentence to be: "These problems can be prevented by protecting the protocol exchanges in PCEP and RSVP-TE using the techniques described in [PSEC] and [RFC2205]." Or reference other techniques if you have them in mind. Best regards, Chris _______________________________________________ secdir mailing list secdir@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/secdir
- [secdir] SECDIR review of draft-ietf-ccamp-path-k… Chris Lonvick
- Re: [secdir] SECDIR review of draft-ietf-ccamp-pa… Adrian Farrel
- Re: [secdir] SECDIR review of draft-ietf-ccamp-pa… Sandy Murphy
- Re: [secdir] SECDIR review of draft-ietf-ccamp-pa… Sandy Murphy
- Re: [secdir] SECDIR review of draft-ietf-ccamp-pa… Adrian Farrel