Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-netconf-partial-lock-09.txt
"Bert (IETF) Wijnen" <bertietf@bwijnen.net> Thu, 13 August 2009 11:36 UTC
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Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2009 13:35:25 +0200
From: "Bert (IETF) Wijnen" <bertietf@bwijnen.net>
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To: Stephen Hanna <shanna@juniper.net>
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Cc: "draft-ietf-netconf-partial-lock@tools.ietf.org" <draft-ietf-netconf-partial-lock@tools.ietf.org>, "Tom.Petch" <sisyphus@dial.pipex.com>, "ietf@ietf.org" <ietf@ietf.org>, "secdir@ietf.org" <secdir@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-netconf-partial-lock-09.txt
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Stephen, I think it is your first bullet point. We have not standardize it yet. And so it is implementation dependent as to what authorization is used. Bert Stephen Hanna wrote: > Tom, > > Thanks for responding to my comments. Allow me to respond. > > You wrote: > >> As a participant in netconf, I see authorization as one of those topics >> which the Working Group sees as necessary but cannot be tackled just >> yet. As RFC4741 says, >> " This document does not specify an authorization scheme, as such a >> scheme should be tied to a meta-data model or a data model." >> and as yet, there is no data model; hence, no authorization, not yet, >> nor, IMHO, for some time to come. >> > > This is just the sort of background information that a WG participant > would know but that a secdir reviewer would not. Please allow me to > ask a clarifying question. You say that there is no authorization yet. > I think that could mean several things: > > 1) Existing NETCONF implementations implement authorization, ensuring > that each user gets an appropriate and perhaps different level of > access to the database. However, there are no standards for the > manner in which authorization is performed or configured. > > 2) Existing NETCONF implementations require authentication but generally > just give complete read-write access to the database to all authenticated > users. > > 3) Existing NETCONF implementations do not require authentication. > Anyone with network access has complete, unfettered access to > the database and can modify it at will. > > Could you tell me which of these meanings is most accurate? > Of course, it could be a mix of these but I'd like to get your > real-world assessment of the state of the NETCONF world. > If the answer is 3), we have a serious problem! If the answer > is 1) or 2), that's acceptable in my view. > > Now on to the language in the draft. My comment was relating to > this quote from the Security Considerations: > > >> "Only an authenticated and authorized user can request a partial >> lock." >> > > I'm afraid that this statement is not justified if there is no > normative text requiring implementations to comply. I suggest > that normative text be added to at least require authentication. > With such text, the statement above could be justified. Requiring > that levels of authorization be implemented is less important > in this application. And standardizing the manner in which > authorization is performed or configured (which I think is > your concern with respect to the lack of a data model) is > really not important at all unless NETCONF customers or > vendors decide that it is. Standardizing an authorization > policy format is a tremendously challenging task for any > protocol and often not necessary. > > I hope that this helps you address my comments in a reasonable > and achievable manner. The intent of secdir comments is not to > impose unreasonable requirements. It is to point out issues that > might not be evident to someone who is not a security expert. > > Thanks, > > Steve > > >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Tom.Petch [mailto:sisyphus@dial.pipex.com] >> Sent: Thursday, August 13, 2009 4:00 AM >> To: Stephen Hanna; secdir@ietf.org; ietf@ietf.org; >> draft-ietf-netconf-partial-lock@tools.ietf.org >> Subject: Re: secdir review of draft-ietf-netconf-partial-lock-09.txt >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> From: "Stephen Hanna" <shanna@juniper.net> >> To: <iesg@ietf.org>; <secdir@ietf.org>; <ietf@ietf.org>; >> <draft-ietf-netconf-partial-lock@tools.ietf.org> >> Sent: Monday, August 10, 2009 4:28 PM >> >> >>> I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's >>> ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the >>> IESG. These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the >>> security area directors. Document editors and WG chairs >>> >> should treat >> >>> these comments just like any other last call comments. >>> >>> This document defines optional partial-lock and partial-unlock >>> operations to be added to the NETCONF protocol. These operations >>> are used to lock only part of a configuration datastore, allowing >>> multiple management sessions to modify the configuration of a >>> device at a single time. >>> >>> The Security Considerations section of the document highlights >>> the risk that a malicious party might employ partial locks to >>> impede access to a device's configuration. Therefore, it states >>> "Only an authenticated and authorized user can request a partial >>> lock." Unfortunately, I cannot find any normative text (MUST) >>> that supports this statement. The NETCONF spec (RFC 4741) says >>> "NETCONF connections must be authenticated" but this is not >>> clearly normative. Perhaps a NETCONF expert can point to some >>> normative text requiring authentication and authorization for >>> any party requesting a partial lock. If not, I suggest that >>> such normative text be added to the partial-lock specification. >>> >>> >> As a participant in netconf, I see authorization as one of >> those topics >> which the Working Group sees as necessary but cannot be tackled just >> yet. As RFC4741 says, >> " This document does not specify an authorization scheme, as such a >> scheme should be tied to a meta-data model or a data model." >> and as yet, there is no data model; hence, no authorization, not yet, >> nor, IMHO, for some time to come. In the light of this, I am not sure >> what adding a normative statement to this I-D would do; delay >> publication sine die? >> >> Tom Petch >> >> >> >> >> >>> Another security concern that I have related to the partial-lock >>> operation is that the configuration might become inconsistent if >>> one manager changes one part of a datastore at the same time that >>> another manager changes another part. The resulting inconsistency >>> could have security implications. For example, an organization might >>> have a rule that either the firewall or the intrusion detection >>> features must be enabled on a device. If one manager might lock >>> intrusion detection configuration, check that the firewall is >>> enabled, and then disable intrusion detection. Another manager >>> might lock the firewall configuration, check that intrusion >>> >> detection >> >>> is enabled, and then disable the firewall. If those operations >>> were interleaved, they could result in a violation of policy. >>> To address this concern, I suggest that the draft contain a >>> warning that parallel operations are tricky and should be >>> carefully considered. Sometimes, it may be necessary to lock >>> a portion of the datastore that will not be modified, just to >>> ensure the datastore remains consistent and compliant with policy. >>> >>> Of course, a human administrator using a GUI could easily >>> run into this same problem if the human does not have the >>> ability to control configuration locks. The human might >>> look at the firewall configuration to make sure that it's >>> enabled and then switch to another section of the display >>> to disable the intrusion detection function. If the management >>> console only locks the datastore to execute the administrator's >>> request to disable intrusion detection, overlapping operations >>> from another administrator could result in a bad configuration. >>> This problem can arise even without the partial lock operation. >>> Probably the best that can be done here is to include language >>> warning of this sort of problem. Warning human administrators >>> that someone else is also editing the device should help and >>> giving these administrators the ability to easily communicate >>> with each other to coordinate their work would also probably help. >>> >>> Here are a few minor issues: >>> >>> * At the end of section 2.1.1.2, the comma in the last >>> sentence is superfluous. >>> >>> * In section 2.1.1.3 in the sentence "Manager A terminates it's >>> session", the apostrophe should be removed. >>> >>> * In section 2.4.1, I think that the sentence that begins with >>> "If someone later creates a new interface" would be clearer >>> if the second comma was changed to "so". >>> >>> * Later in section 2.4.1, the sentence that begins with >>> "A NETCONF server MUST" should instead start with "A NETCONF >>> server that supports partial locks MUST". I think that >>> paragraph should end with "all of the overlapping locks are >>> released" not "all of the locks are released". >>> _______________________________________________ >>> Ietf mailing list >>> Ietf@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf >>> >> > _______________________________________________ > Ietf mailing list > Ietf@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf > > >
- [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-netconf-part… Stephen Hanna
- Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-netconf-… Stephen Hanna
- Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-netconf-… Romascanu, Dan (Dan)
- Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-netconf-… Tom.Petch
- Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-netconf-… Bert (IETF) Wijnen
- Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-netconf-… Stephen Hanna
- Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-netconf-… Andy Bierman
- Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-netconf-… Wes Hardaker
- Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-netconf-… Andy Bierman
- Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-netconf-… Wes Hardaker
- Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-netconf-… Andy Bierman
- Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-netconf-… Tom.Petch