Re: [secdir] SecDir Review for draft-ietf-trill-oam-mib-06

[Donald Eastlake <[e-mail]>]

HI Deepak,

On Sun, Aug 9, 2015 at 10:07 PM, Deepak Kumar (dekumar)
<[e-mail]> wrote:
> Hi Yoav,
>
> Thanks for review and comments. Please advise if we need to fix the nits
> and comments and upload new version as I am not sure about procedure of
> fixing comments during last call.
>
> Tissa has moved out of Cisco and working in another Company, I don¹t have
> privy of his new contact so I will contact him to get new contact and
> update the document also.

I've added Tissa to the cc list above. I believe that for now he wants
to be listed with "Consultant" as his affiliation and with email
address <[e-mail]>.

The IETF LC ends the 13th, in a few days. I suggest that you update
the contact info for Tissa, spell out OAM, and update the
MODULE-IDENTITY, since those don't seem like they would be
controversial. For any changes to the Security Considerations text, I
suggest you post proposed text in this thread before editing it in.

Thanks,
Donald (Shepherd)
=============================
 Donald E. Eastlake 3rd   [phone] (cell)
 155 Beaver Street, Milford, MA 01757 USA
 [e-mail]

> Thanks,
> Deepak
>
> On 8/8/15, 2:18 PM, "Yoav Nir" <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
>>Hi.
>>
>>I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
>>ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.
>>These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security
>>area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat these
>>comments just like any other last call comments.
>>
>>TL;DR: The document is ready with nits.
>>
>>The document contains a MIB for operations, administration, and
>>maintenance (OAM) of TRILL. As is common for such documents, 34 of its 45
>>pages is section 7 ("Definition of the TRILL OAM MIB module²). Being an
>>expert on neither TRILL nor MIBs I have mostly skipped that section.
>>
>>Usually with MIB documents, the security considerations for the protocol
>>(several TRILL RFCs in this case) are in the protocol documents, while
>>the security considerations for SNMP are in the SNMP document (RFC 3410).
>>The MIB document only points data that is sensitive (in terms of privacy
>>or information leakage), and data which is dangerous in the sense that
>>falsified or modified data could lead to damage.
>>
>>In this document the Security Considerations section does a good job of
>>explaining that modified data can lead to changes in routing and
>>potentially to denial of service. The second paragraph is a little
>>hand-wavy for my taste:
>>
>>   There are number of management objects defined in this MIB module
>>   with a MAX-ACCESS clause of read-create. Such objects may be
>>   considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments.
>>
>>What network environment? Why in some but not in others? The third
>>paragraph is similar:
>>
>>   Some of the readable objects in this MIB module (objects with a MAC-
>>   ACCESS other than not-accessible) may be considered sensitive or
>>   vulnerable in some network environments.
>>
>>The section concludes with text that looks very familiar from other MIB
>>documents, basically saying that you should use SNMPv3 because it has
>>protections whereas earlier versions don¹t. It is also important to have
>>proper access control rules. One nit is that the section says that the
>>cryptographic mechanisms in SNMPv3 provide ³privacy². As of late we tend
>>to use that word for the protection of information about humans, not so
>>much about link status.
>>
>>A few general nits:
>> - In most documents that I see, the content of sections 1-4 is in a
>>single section.
>> - OAM is not expanded before first use.
>> - The MODULE-IDENTITY has ³TBD² for ORGANIZATION and authors¹ names in
>>CONTACT-INFO. looking at a few recent MIB documents, the working group is
>>usually given as ORGANIZATION and its mailing list is given as contact
>>info.
>>
>>Yoav
>>
>