[secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-avtcore-multi-party-rtt-mix-16

Rich Salz via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> Thu, 06 May 2021 14:36 UTC

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Date: Thu, 06 May 2021 07:36:29 -0700
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Subject: [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-avtcore-multi-party-rtt-mix-16
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Reviewer: Rich Salz
Review result: Ready

This review is for the benefit of the Security AD's. Nobody else should read
this. Or, if you read it, treat it as any other last call review :)

I know very little about WebRTC, AVT, etc.

I thought Section 1.2, summary of the alternatives, was great. I wish more
documents did this kind of thing. And similar for all of section 2. The details
in Section 3 about how to comply seem very clear. If I were implementing this,
I could use easily use this as a checklist and test suite. Section 3.19 is the
most important one for transport security. Not knowing the operating
environments, it seems reasonable.

The security considerations seems a little scant, given the opportunity for
privacy concerns of participants and for intruders to disrupt calls. Is it
common that the mixer is a trusted entity? A statement on that either way would
be useful.