Re: [secdir] Security review of draft-ietf-mpls-tp-psc-itu-02.txt

"Hilarie Orman" <> Mon, 24 February 2014 05:51 UTC

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Date: Sun, 23 Feb 2014 22:51:41 -0700
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From: Hilarie Orman <>
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Subject: Re: [secdir] Security review of draft-ietf-mpls-tp-psc-itu-02.txt
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Something like:

"This document introduces no new security risks.  RFC 6378 points out
that MPLS relies on assumptions about traffic injection difficulty and
assumes the the control plane does not have end-to-end security.
RFC520 describes MPLS security issues and generic methods for securing
traffic privacy and integrity.  MPLS use should conform such advice."


>  From: "Ryoo, Jeong-dong" <>
>  Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2014 04:35:08 +0000
Dear Hilarie,

Thanks for your comment.

I am not sure about what text has actually to be put in the Section 13 to reflect your suggestion.
Do you have any text in mind?

Best regards,


>From : "Hilarie Orman" <>
Sent : 2014-02-24 09:36:04 ( +09:00 )
To : <>, <>
Cc : <>
Subject : Security review of draft-ietf-mpls-tp-psc-itu-02.txt

Security review of draft-ietf-mpls-tp-psc-itu-02.txt
MPLS Transport Profile (MPLS-TP) Linear Protection to Match the
Operational Expectations of SDH, OTN and Ethernet Transport Network

Do not be alarmed. I have reviewed this document as part of the
security directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents
being processed by the IESG. These comments were written primarily
for the benefit of the security area directors. Document editors and
WG chairs should treat these comments just like any other last call

The abstract for this document states:
This document describes alternate mechanisms to perform some of the
sub-functions of MPLS Transport Profile (MPLS-TP) linear protection
defined in RFC 6378, and also defines additional mechanisms. The
purpose of these alternate and additional mechanisms is to provide
operator control and experience that more closely models the behavior
of linear protection seen in other transport networks.

The security considerations are the timeworn statement that

No specific security issue is raised in addition to those ones
already documented in RFC 6378 [RFC6378]

In RFC 6378 we find:
MPLS networks make the assumption that it is very hard to inject
traffic into a network and equally hard to cause traffic to be
directed outside the network. The control-plane protocols utilize
hop-by-hop security and assume a "chain-of-trust" model such that
end-to-end control-plane security is not used. For more
information on the generic aspects of MPLS security, see [RFC5920].

To my great astonishment I found that "RFC5920 Security Framework for
MPLS and GMPLS Networks" is an excellent document, and it is my
suggestion that the current draft reference it directly in section 13
"Security Considerations".

Barring any surprises in the extensive state diagrams, I otherwise am
inclined to accept the "no new issues" handwave.