Re: [secdir] MTI ... Re: Security review of draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-management-12
stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie Wed, 01 April 2015 17:36 UTC
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Date: Wed, 01 Apr 2015 17:36:43 +0000
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Subject: Re: [secdir] MTI ... Re: Security review of draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-reg-management-12
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On Wed Apr 1 18:05:44 2015 GMT+0100, Hannes Tschofenig wrote: > Ben, Stephen, > > I believe that this would be a good idea although it does not really > solve the underlying problem. Why? If we put a reference to the UTA BCP > in there then we end up in the need to update our documents in the not > too distance future to point to a new UTA BCP that talks about TLS 1.3. No. Put in the bcp number and not the rfc number. S > > Ciao > Hannes > > > On 04/01/2015 06:14 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: > > > > > > On 01/04/15 17:11, Benjamin Kaduk wrote: > >> On Wed, 1 Apr 2015, Hannes Tschofenig wrote: > >> > >>> I personally would like to replace these types of recommendations with > >>> references to a page on the IETF website that talks about the most > >>> recent TLS & ciphersuite recommendations. I am aware that this might > >>> create problems with claiming interoperability with a specific RFC... > >> > >> Why not a BCP document for TLS usage? It seems to be a charter item for > >> the uta WG already... > > > > Well, initially OAuth wanted some specifics that matched the > > deployments then seen, but yeah, I think the world may have > > moved on sufficiently that a simple reference to the UTA BCP > > (which is in the RFC editor queue) [1] might be fine. I'd > > say it's defo worth asking the wg if they'd have a problem > > with that now. > > > > S. > > > > [1] https://www.rfc-editor.org/queue2.html#draft-ietf-uta-tls-bcp > > > > > >> > >> -Ben > >> > >
- [secdir] Security review of draft-ietf-oauth-dyn-… Ben Laurie
- [secdir] MTI ... Re: Security review of draft-iet… Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [secdir] MTI ... Re: Security review of draft… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [secdir] MTI ... Re: Security review of draft… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [secdir] MTI ... Re: Security review of draft… Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [secdir] MTI ... Re: Security review of draft… Kathleen Moriarty
- Re: [secdir] MTI ... Re: Security review of draft… stephen.farrell
- Re: [secdir] MTI ... Re: Security review of draft… Ben Laurie
- Re: [secdir] MTI ... Re: Security review of draft… Radia Perlman
- Re: [secdir] MTI ... Re: Security review of draft… Hannes Tschofenig
- Re: [secdir] MTI ... Re: Security review of draft… Ben Laurie
- Re: [secdir] MTI ... Re: Security review of draft… Stephen Farrell
- Re: [secdir] MTI ... Re: Security review of draft… Kathleen Moriarty
- Re: [secdir] Security review of draft-ietf-oauth-… Ben Laurie
- Re: [secdir] Security review of draft-ietf-oauth-… Ben Laurie
- Re: [secdir] Security review of draft-ietf-oauth-… Justin Richer
- Re: [secdir] Security review of draft-ietf-oauth-… Justin Richer
- Re: [secdir] Security review of draft-ietf-oauth-… Justin Richer
- Re: [secdir] Security review of draft-ietf-oauth-… Kathleen Moriarty
- Re: [secdir] Security review of draft-ietf-oauth-… Justin Richer
- Re: [secdir] Security review of draft-ietf-oauth-… Ben Laurie