[secdir] Secdir telechat review of draft-ietf-dnsop-must-not-sha1-06

Yoav Nir via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> Sun, 13 April 2025 18:01 UTC

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From: Yoav Nir via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org>
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Date: Sun, 13 Apr 2025 11:01:37 -0700
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CC: dnsop@ietf.org, draft-ietf-dnsop-must-not-sha1.all@ietf.org, last-call@ietf.org
Reply-To: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
Subject: [secdir] Secdir telechat review of draft-ietf-dnsop-must-not-sha1-06
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/YCagRk5T0qkbi_3hlfRT6ddiU7A>

Document: draft-ietf-dnsop-must-not-sha1
Title: Deprecating the use of SHA-1 in DNSSEC signature algorithms
Reviewer: Yoav Nir
Review result: Ready

The document is fine as it is. I will say that the Security Considerations
section is a bit strange:

   This document deprecates the use of RSASHA1 and RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1
   signatures since they are no longer considered to be secure.

But that is a common problem with documents like this that deprecate existing
algorithms or protocol options for security reasons. Some documents got around
this by claiming that the whole document is security considerations. For
example, a draft of RFC 7568 (deprecating SSLv3) said:

   This entire document aims to improve security by prohibiting the use
   of a protocol that is not secure.

But they toned it down for the final RFC.  Anyway, it's fine as it is.

[secdir] Secdir telechat review of draft-ietf-dns… Yoav Nir via Datatracker
[secdir] Re: Secdir telechat review of draft-ietf… Wes Hardaker