Re: [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-tcpm-rto-consider-14

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Mon, 06 July 2020 20:33 UTC

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Date: Mon, 06 Jul 2020 13:33:12 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Liang Xia <frank.xialiang@huawei.com>
Cc: secdir@ietf.org, last-call@ietf.org, tcpm@ietf.org, draft-ietf-tcpm-rto-consider.all@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-tcpm-rto-consider-14
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Hi Frank,

Thanks for the review.  I agree that what's presented in the document is
pretty straightforward and without direct security issues, however, I chose
to try to broaden the scope of the document slightly, balloting Discuss to
suggest adding a requirement that (when writing new protocols) the ACKs
used as input for RTO algorithms be unspoofable from off-path (i.e., have
enough entropy to be unguessable).  That kind of scope expansion is
probably outside the scope (pun intended) of a typical secdir review,
though :)

Thanks,

Ben

On Mon, May 25, 2020 at 05:54:56PM -0700, Liang Xia via Datatracker wrote:
> Reviewer: Liang Xia
> Review result: Ready
> 
> This document is good written, and no new security issues as it's a network
> mechanism requirements BCP document.
> 
> 
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