[secdir] secdir review of: draft-ietf-behave-turn-tcp-06

"Patrick Cain" <pcain@coopercain.com> Mon, 29 March 2010 21:16 UTC

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From: "Patrick Cain" <pcain@coopercain.com>
To: <secdir@ietf.org>, <draft-ietf-behave-turn-tcp.all@tools.ietf.org>
Date: Mon, 29 Mar 2010 17:17:05 -0400
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Cc: iesg@ietf.org
Subject: [secdir] secdir review of: draft-ietf-behave-turn-tcp-06
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I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's 
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the 
IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the 
security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat 
these comments just like any other last call comments.

   The document defines an extension of Traversal Using Relays
   around NAT (TURN), a relay protocol for NAT traversal, to allow a
   TURN client to request TCP allocations, and defines new requests and
   indications for the TURN server to open and accept TCP connections
   with the client's peers.

After reading the other four-letter protocol specs (TURN, STUN) I have no 
problems with this document. The new features do not raise any security 
concerns that are not already addressed in the base TURN documents.

Pat Cain