Re: [secdir] [payload] sec-dir review of draft-ietf-payload-rtp-opus-08

"Ben Campbell" <ben@nostrum.com> Mon, 06 April 2015 16:13 UTC

Return-Path: <ben@nostrum.com>
X-Original-To: secdir@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: secdir@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7BC921A8AF5; Mon, 6 Apr 2015 09:13:48 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.91
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.91 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, T_RP_MATCHES_RCVD=-0.01] autolearn=ham
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id rSuxXTk6HAjx; Mon, 6 Apr 2015 09:13:44 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from nostrum.com (raven-v6.nostrum.com [IPv6:2001:470:d:1130::1]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 10EE21A8AED; Mon, 6 Apr 2015 09:13:44 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from [10.0.1.23] (cpe-173-172-146-58.tx.res.rr.com [173.172.146.58]) (authenticated bits=0) by nostrum.com (8.15.1/8.14.9) with ESMTPSA id t36GDUo1007147 (version=TLSv1 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 6 Apr 2015 11:13:40 -0500 (CDT) (envelope-from ben@nostrum.com)
X-Authentication-Warning: raven.nostrum.com: Host cpe-173-172-146-58.tx.res.rr.com [173.172.146.58] claimed to be [10.0.1.23]
From: Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com>
To: Derek Atkins <derek@ihtfp.com>
Date: Mon, 06 Apr 2015 11:13:30 -0500
Message-ID: <269A06E2-6704-4E5E-BBFD-92F157639261@nostrum.com>
In-Reply-To: <sjmy4m5grwp.fsf@securerf.ihtfp.org>
References: <sjmoaosz53h.fsf@securerf.ihtfp.org> <54E3A32F.2010008@jmvalin.ca> <760B7D45D1EFF74988DBF5C2122830C24D064CDE@szxpml507-mbx.exmail.huawei.com> <sjmk2zdzv6g.fsf@securerf.ihtfp.org> <916F29B3-E392-481B-A269-FBA58DFEF14D@nostrum.com> <551C612B.4030702@mozilla.com> <C3DD8EE5-B066-4C06-99F4-B9147A128811@nostrum.com> <C17AE3D5-F62D-42A3-9F1F-885BF1B984EB@nostrum.com> <551EFB9C.4040504@xiph.org> <sjmy4m5grwp.fsf@securerf.ihtfp.org>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; format="flowed"
X-Mailer: MailMate (1.9.1r5084)
Archived-At: <http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/secdir/_m6aH5VifmHhJlT5kIcbWUB63vk>
Cc: Jean-Marc Valin <jmvalin@mozilla.com>, "secdir@ietf.org" <secdir@ietf.org>, payload@ietf.org, "jspittka@gmail.com" <jspittka@gmail.com>, "iesg@ietf.org" <iesg@ietf.org>, "payload-chairs@tools.ietf.org" <payload-chairs@tools.ietf.org>, "koenvos74@gmail.com" <koenvos74@gmail.com>, "Timothy B. Terriberry" <tterribe@xiph.org>
Subject: Re: [secdir] [payload] sec-dir review of draft-ietf-payload-rtp-opus-08
X-BeenThere: secdir@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: Security Area Directorate <secdir.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/secdir>, <mailto:secdir-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/secdir/>
List-Post: <mailto:secdir@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:secdir-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/secdir>, <mailto:secdir-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 06 Apr 2015 16:13:48 -0000

On 6 Apr 2015, at 11:09, Derek Atkins wrote:

> "Timothy B. Terriberry" <tterribe@xiph.org> writes:
>
>> Ben Campbell wrote:
>>>> So my suggestion would be something more to the effect of:
>>>>
>>>> "Opus does not provide any built-in confidentiality or integrity
>>>> protection. Protection requirements vary between RTP applications.
>>>> See RFC 7201 and RFC 7202 for a discussion.
>>
>> This seems like reasonable text to me. I agree with the rationale 
>> that
>> preceded it. As much as I want to see encryption everywhere, a 
>> payload
>> format is not the right place to mandate it.
>
> As was stated already in this thread, the expected follow up drafts 
> for
> MTI security have not been written.
>
> I leave it up to the Security ADs who have the real power here, but I
> still prefer my original wording (including the SHOULD).
>
> I understand your reluctance because it's a codec, but it's the first
> codec to get through the process since the Perpass work, which 
> basically
> says "everything should be encrypted."  Since you cannot go back in 
> time
> to modify the existing RFCs, you can augment them going forward by 
> other
> additions.
>
> As for the concern about "different security requirements for 
> different
> codecs", frankly I don't buy that argument.  Either your RTP 
> application
> supports security or it doesn't.  Once it does, it should be able to
> negotiate that along side the codec negotitation.  So I don't see the
> concern -- we're not mandating a specific security technology, just 
> that
> you SHOULD use one.  Well, that's true regardless of the codec, isn't
> it?
>
> Or are you really saying "We don't care about security.  We just want 
> to
> be able to use this codec in existing, insecure RTP applications 
> without
> adding new securty measures"?

I'm saying this is the wrong layer to solve the problem.

We had some work planned to better specify this in general for RTP. I 
think the right answer is finish that work. If we do that right, it 
should apply regardless of codec.