Re: [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-rtgwg-spf-uloop-pb-statement-09

Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com> Sat, 12 January 2019 05:06 UTC

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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 12 Jan 2019 00:06:06 -0500
Message-ID: <CAMm+LwgirJoqcjE7ATakk475o93M6LNLyerF19gsoK5SSjag8A@mail.gmail.com>
To: Stewart Bryant <stewart.bryant@gmail.com>
Cc: secdir@ietf.org, draft-ietf-rtgwg-spf-uloop-pb-statement.all@ietf.org, IETF Discussion Mailing List <ietf@ietf.org>, rtgwg@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-rtgwg-spf-uloop-pb-statement-09
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If the security considerations are addressed in a different document, this
should be stated in the security considerations section.

On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 12:05 PM Stewart Bryant <stewart.bryant@gmail.com>;
wrote:

>
> On 07/01/2019 16:11, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>
> Reviewer: Phillip Hallam-Baker
> Review result: Has Issues
>
> The document describes the problem and solution pretty clearly. Unfortunately,
> there is no discussion of the security considerations which is not appropriate
> for a document addressing an availability which is a security issue.
>
> While microloops can form by chance, some consideration should be given to the
> possibility that an attacker could induce a loop to perform a DoS attack.
>
> In section 1 the text says:
>
> [RFC8405] defines a solution that satisfies this problem statement
>    and this document captures the reasoning of the provided solution.
>
> It is safe to assume that the reader of this text would have read
> normative reference RFC8405 and thus would be fully aware of the security
> issues related to the solution being analysed.
>
> An attacker that had access to a network such that they could induce
> microloops would have the ability to do many worse things to the network.
>
> If they were able to attack in-band they could poison the routing system
> to take it down in far more interesting ways. Operators use security at the
> physical and network layer to prevent this.
>
> If they were operating at the physical layer then they could take circuits
> down at will and cause microloops in the base protocol, traffic overloads
> and application malfunction.
>
> Thus if the attacker could deploy either of those attacks in a network to
> induce micro-loops, then any security considerations in this draft would
> count for nothing.
>
> The draft is an analysis, and thus I think that it correctly states that
> it introduces no additional matters for security consideration.
>
> - Stewart
>
>

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