Re: [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-16

"Mr. Jaehoon Paul Jeong" <jaehoon.paul@gmail.com> Wed, 19 May 2021 01:19 UTC

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From: "Mr. Jaehoon Paul Jeong" <jaehoon.paul@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 19 May 2021 10:19:02 +0900
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To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
Cc: secdir@ietf.org, draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model.all@ietf.org, "i2nsf@ietf.org" <i2nsf@ietf.org>, Last Call <last-call@ietf.org>, Patrick Lingga <patricklink888@gmail.com>, skku-iotlab-members <skku-iotlab-members@googlegroups.com>, "Mr. Jaehoon Paul Jeong" <jaehoon.paul@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-i2nsf-capability-data-model-16
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Hi Paul,
I will address your comments on the Security Section.

Thanks for your valuable comments to improve our draft.

Best Regards,
Paul Jeong

On Wed, May 19, 2021 at 5:16 AM Paul Wouters via Datatracker <
noreply@ietf.org> wrote:

> Reviewer: Paul Wouters
> Review result: Has Nits
>
> I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
> ongoing
> effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the  IESG.  These
> comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area
> directors.
>  Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments just like any
> other
> last call comments.
>
> The summary of the review Has Nits
>
> The issues that  Michael Scharf raised regarding TOS have been addressed.
> Thank
> you. I have no items that are serious issues, just some comments that you
> may
> take into consideration for a minor update.
>
> Nits:
>
> The privacy section talks about a trade-off between privacy and security.
> But I
> do not understand what trade-off is meant. The document does not seem to
> make
> any trade-off. It just defines capabilities that can be used, some of which
> might process private material. But the trade-offs of that are really at
> the
> protocol level (like they did use TLS or IPsec or why not). I dont think
> describing technical capabilities is a trade-off of security vs privacy.
> Perhaps the section could talk about the discovery and/or usage of
> capabilities
> and that those capabilities handling private information should attempt to
> report their usage/findings/events underst conditions that preserve the
> privacy
> (eg require TLS or IPsec between SG and NSF ?)
>
> The Security section talks about layers that "can use" SSH or TLS for
> security.
> I'm not sure why it does not say SHOULD or MUST ? I would rewrite "need to
> be
> tightly secured and monitored" to "MUST be tightly secured, monitored and
> audited".
>
> Section 3.1 states:
>
>     These capabilities MAY have their access control restricted by a
> policy;
>
> In light of the other recommendations in the Security Section, I think
> this MAY
> should really be a SHOULD or even MUST. Alternatively, perhaps say "Some of
> these capabilities SHOULD" ?
>
>
>
>
>
>
>