Re: [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-tictoc-1588v2-yang-10

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Thu, 04 October 2018 02:50 UTC

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Date: Wed, 3 Oct 2018 21:49:53 -0500
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Samuel Weiler <weiler@csail.mit.edu>
Cc: secdir@ietf.org, draft-ietf-tictoc-1588v2-yang.all@ietf.org, ietf@ietf.org, tictoc@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [secdir] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-tictoc-1588v2-yang-10
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On Wed, Oct 03, 2018 at 08:18:55AM -0700, Samuel Weiler wrote:
> Reviewer: Samuel Weiler
> Review result: Has Issues
> 
> I wonder whether there should be a requirement to use authentication when
> making updates.  As the doc says:

The NETCONF and RESTCONF secure transport layers already handle the
authentication requirements.  E.g., RFC 8040 Section 2.5:

   The RESTCONF server MUST authenticate client access to any protected
   resource.  If the RESTCONF client is not authenticated, the server
   SHOULD send an HTTP response with a "401 Unauthorized" status-line,
   as defined in Section 3.1 of [RFC7235].  The error-tag value
   "access-denied" is used in this case.

But thank you for doing the review, and you're right that this is
important!

-Ben

>    Write operations (e.g., edit-config) to these data nodes without
>    proper protection can have a negative effect on network operations.
> 
> I'm sure someone will argue "if this is used in a closed network, we can avoid
> the use of authentication".  Prudence suggests that "closed" networks don't
> remain that way forever, and defense-in-depth is advisable.  Let's add a MUST
> or at least a SHOULD.
> 
>