[secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-v6ops-rogue-ra

[Samuel Weiler <[e-mail]>]

I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the
IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the
security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat
these comments just like any other last call comments.

This expired doc has been in the secdir queue for some time.  It's not 
clear what the current state is, but I gave it a once-over now and 
will look at it again if it's ever revived.

While the security considerations sectional is minimal, that's 
generally fine for an informational doc such as this.

That said, I would like to see more thought given to malicious RAs and 
whether each of these methods could be effectively applied against 
them (e.g. how easy is each to subvert?).  And if none of the methods 
are applicable, as the current security considerations says, then also 
call that out in the abstract and intro.

Second, I'm surprised that the only end-host based solutions are 
staticly-configured packet filters (3.7) and delays (3.9).  Why not 
simply "try, try again": accept multiple RAs, see which ones work, and 
discard (or at least don't use) the rest?

Lastly, the table in section 4 is a little unclear: does "Y" mean 
"helps (somewhat)" or "is completely sufficient"?  I think it means 
the former, but clarity would be good.