Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-pce-pcep-mib-10

Benoit Claise <> Wed, 29 October 2014 14:21 UTC

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Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2014 15:21:04 +0100
From: Benoit Claise <>
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To: David Harrington <>,
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Subject: Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-pce-pcep-mib-10
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Thanks David for your answer.

Regards, Benoit
> Hi,
> I’m a MIB Doctor, not an AD.
> But I’ll respond anyway.
> The text in the boilerplate went through a long negotiation process balancing interoperability, SNMP best current practices, and security best current practices.
> The boilerplate represents the result - the best current practices related to interoperable security for SNMP and the MIB.
> The boilerplate text should NOT be modified on a MIB-module by MIB-module basis.
> The document being reviewed changed the boilerplate, changing SHOULD implement SNMPv3 into MUST implement SNMPv3.
> While desirable, that is actually incorrect for interoperability reasons.
> Theoretically, MIB modules are independent of the protocol carrying the data defined in the module.
> MIB modules should always be independent of the SNMP version that carries the data. So this MIB module, if correctly designed, should also work using SNMPv1/v2 or (maybe some time in the future) an SNMPv4.
> This MIB module should also be able to be used with Netconf, using the MIB-to-YANG conversion standard.
> So changing the SHOULD implement SNMPv3 to MUST implement SNMPv3 is incorrect, because SNMPv3 is NOT REQUIRED for this MIB module to work.
> The best way for a document to address the security requirements for a MIB module, is to use the boilerplate verbatim, modifying only those places where it calls for a list of the sensitive objects, and the reasons why they are considered sensitive.
> David Harrington
> On Oct 24, 2014, at 7:54 AM, Adrian Farrel <> wrote:
>> Sec and Ops ADs...
>> Could you please interpret this review by Carl in the context of the "best current advice" and boilerplate for MIB modules.
>> Thanks,
>> Adrian
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: iesg [] On Behalf Of Carl Wallace
>>> Sent: 24 October 2014 12:31
>>> To:
>>> Cc:;
>>> Subject: secdir review of draft-ietf-pce-pcep-mib-10
>>> I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
>>> ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG.
>>> These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area
>>> directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments
>>> just like any other last call comments.
>>> This document describes a MIB that "describes managed objects for modeling
>>> of Path Computation Element communications Protocol (PCEP) for
>>> communications between a Path Computation Client (PCC) and a Path
>>> Computation Element (PCE), or between two PCEs”.
>>> I am not a MIB guy and did not review the definitions.  The security
>>> considerations section mostly addresses SNMP related considerations in
>>> general via references to other specs.  This seems fine.  The only minor
>>> nit here is the following:
>>> 	Implementations MUST provide the security features described by the
>>> SNMPv3 framework (see [RFC3410]), including full support for
>>> authentication and privacy via the User-based Security Model (USM)
>>> [RFC3414] with the AES cipher algorithm [RFC3826].
>>> RFC3410 only defines support for use of CBC-DES.  If support for AES is
>>> intended instead of DES, that should be noted more strongly here.  The
>>> requirement for "full support" of RFC3414 could be misinterpreted.
>> _______________________________________________
>> secdir mailing list
>> wiki:
> .