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Re: [secdir] [Last-Call] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-opsawg-finding-geofeeds-06

Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Mon, 03 May 2021 15:34 UTC

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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Mon, 03 May 2021 11:28:21 -0400
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Cc: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>, Last Call <last-call@ietf.org>, Ops Area WG <opsawg@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-opsawg-finding-geofeeds.all@ietf.org, IETF SecDir <secdir@ietf.org>
To: Kyle Rose <krose@krose.org>
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Subject: Re: [secdir] [Last-Call] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-opsawg-finding-geofeeds-06
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> On May 3, 2021, at 10:47 AM, Kyle Rose <krose@krose.org> wrote:
> 
> On Mon, May 3, 2021 at 10:40 AM Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com <mailto:housley@vigilsec.com>> wrote:
> 
>> Understood. I'm not suggesting the web PKI be used to authenticate IP address space ownership. I'm suggesting that the following chain would be sufficient:
>> 
>>  * RPKI authenticates the routing information, which includes the IP address space and the https URLs for each geofeed file.
>>  * Web PKI authenticates the data served at that URL.
>>  * Client verifies that the IP ranges in the geofeed data are contained within the (RPKI-authenticated) routing information.
> 
> This is not quite right.  It is true that theWebPKI provide authentication and integrity when https:// is used, but this is not required.  If http:// were used, and the file was modified in transit by an attacker, the RPKI signature check would fail.
> 
> Yes. Which is why I'm suggesting that you mandate https.

I do not have a problem mandating the use of https:// for authentication and integrity protection of the file.  I think that is shown in the examples.  I am saying that doing so does not "chain" the trust models.

Russ

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