Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-mipshop-rfc5268bis-01
Vijay Devarapalli <vijay@wichorus.com> Tue, 28 April 2009 15:49 UTC
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Date: Tue, 28 Apr 2009 08:50:34 -0700
From: Vijay Devarapalli <vijay@wichorus.com>
To: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf@checkpoint.com>
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Thread-Topic: Secdir review of draft-ietf-mipshop-rfc5268bis-01
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Cc: "draft-ietf-mipshop-rfc5268bis@tools.ietf.org" <draft-ietf-mipshop-rfc5268bis@tools.ietf.org>, "iesg@ietf.org" <iesg@ietf.org>, "secdir@ietf.org" <secdir@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-mipshop-rfc5268bis-01
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Hi Yaron, On 4/28/09 12:42 AM, "Yaron Sheffer" wrote: > Hi Vijay, > > Actually you are proving my point :-) No it doesn't. > The cost of setting up a security > association (e.g. an IKE exchange) will be amortized over many HI/HACK uses. The cost of implementing and configuring a key negotiation protocol is not worth it when we are looking at just one IPsec SA for all FMIPv6 related signaling between the access routers. So I don't think having some text that says "a key negotiation protocols is RECOMMENDED" is justified. If deployments don't want to deal with manual IPsec keying (because it is a hassle), they will start using IKEv2 automatically. > And automatic key management is a BCP for some very good reasons, including: > - Limiting the lifetime of keys. > - Facilitating algorithm agility. > - Enabling the use of shorter shared secrets and/or certificates. > - Mitigating the harmful effect of using "widely shared" secrets (where all > group members see the same shared secret). > - Improving the entropy of encryption keys compared to human generated > "random" values. > > I'm sure there are a few other reasons I've forgotten. Almost all of these are not a concern when we talk about access routers in an FMIPv6 domain, IMO. Vijay > > Thanks, > Yaron > >> -----Original Message----- >> From: Vijay Devarapalli [mailto:vijay@wichorus.com] >> Sent: Tuesday, April 28, 2009 0:17 >> To: Yaron Sheffer >> Cc: secdir@ietf.org; iesg@ietf.org; draft-ietf-mipshop- >> rfc5268bis@tools.ietf.org >> Subject: Re: Secdir review of draft-ietf-mipshop-rfc5268bis-01 >> >> Hi Yaron, >> >> Yaron Sheffer wrote: >>> I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's >> ongoing >>> effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the IESG. These >>> comments were written primarily for the benefit of the security area >>> directors. Document editors and WG chairs should treat these comments >> just >>> like any other last call comments. >>> >>> This document updates RFC 5268 (itself quite recent) by changing some >> ICMP >>> messages into more modern mobility header-carrying messages. I don't >> believe >>> this has any security implications. In fact the document includes very >>> thorough Security Considerations, inherited from RFC 5268 and slightly >>> adapted for the new message formats. >>> >>> One issue that came up before the original RFC was published is the >>> protocol's liberality regarding (1) manual keying vs. key management >>> protocols, and (2) the choice of authentication method. The second issue >> was >>> rectified by adding the text: "If IKEv2 is used [...] to ensure a >> baseline >>> interoperability, the implementations MUST support shared secrets for >> mutual >>> authentication." But this leaves the first issue open: manual keying >> remains >>> an option. So I propose to add to: >>> >>> "The security associations can be created by using either manual IPsec >>> configuration or a dynamic key negotiation protocol such as IKEv2 >>> [rfc4306]." >>> >>> This new text: >>> >>> "Following the recommendations of RFC 5406 (Sec. 3.3), the use of a key >>> negotiation protocol is RECOMMENDED." >> >> I don't see this as being applicable to security associations setup >> between two access routers in the same domain. Note that the access >> routers need just one security association for protecting the HI and >> HACK messages for all the mobile nodes. Recommending the use of a key >> negotiation protocol in this case would be over specification, IMO. >> >> Vijay >> >> Scanned by Check Point Total Security Gateway.
- [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-xcon-event-p… Yaron Sheffer
- Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-xcon-eve… Gonzalo Camarillo
- [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-mipshop-rfc5… Yaron Sheffer
- Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-mipshop-… Vijay Devarapalli
- Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-mipshop-… Yaron Sheffer
- Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-mipshop-… Jari Arkko
- Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-mipshop-… Vijay Devarapalli