Re: [secdir] Spam:*******, Secdir Review of draft-ietf-idr-rfc4893bis-07 (resend of a resend)

["John G. Scudder" <[e-mail]>]

WFM. 

--John

On Jul 17, 2012, at 9:03 AM, Stewart Bryant <[e-mail]> wrote:

> It seems like a good suggestion to me
> 
> Stewart
> 
> On 17/07/2012 16:47, Susan Hares wrote:
>> Adrian:
>> 
>> 100% agree with your viewpoint and next steps.
>> 
>> John and Stuart - can we change to this view point.
>> 
>> Sue
>> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Adrian Farrel [mailto:[e-mail]]
>> Sent: Tuesday, July 17, 2012 11:44 AM
>> To: 'Susan Hares'; 'John G. Scudder'; [e-mail]
>> Cc: [e-mail]; 'Murphy, Sandra'; [e-mail];
>> [e-mail]; 'Catherine Meadows';
>> [e-mail]
>> Subject: RE: Spam:*******, Secdir Review of draft-ietf-idr-rfc4893bis-07
>> (resend of a resend)
>> 
>> IMHO, you are right Sue. Stating "MUST NOT" in a specification does not
>> prevent something from happening.
>> Using "MUST NOT" for a specification is fine because we can test for
>> conformance to that and strike an implementation that does not respect the
>> language.
>> Using "MUST NOT" in a description of an operator process is not as strong or
>> useful.
>> 
>> I think that "weakening" loop detection is a bad thing, but it is also a
>> price an operator might want to pay to get moved to 4byte AS numbers quickly
>> when a few corner boxes might take another 12 months to be upgraded.
>> 
>> I agree with John that the text is not security-related.
>> 
>> So, I would rephrase and reposition the text.
>> - Do explain the risk of switching to 4bytes before everyone is upgraded.
>> - Do explain the boundaries to the risk
>> - Do expect operators to consider the implications
>> - Don't mandate what an operator does in the privacy of their own bedroom
>> 
>> A
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: [e-mail] [mailto:[e-mail]] On Behalf
>>> Of Susan Hares
>>> Sent: 17 July 2012 16:34
>>> To: 'John G. Scudder'; [e-mail]
>>> Cc: [e-mail]; 'Murphy, Sandra'; [e-mail];
>> [e-mail];
>>> 'Catherine Meadows'; [e-mail]
>>> Subject: RE: Spam:*******, Secdir Review of
>>> draft-ietf-idr-rfc4893bis-07
>> (resend
>>> of a resend)
>>> 
>>> John and Stuart:
>>> 
>>> This an acceptable text, and we can go on with this draft.
>>> 
>>> However,  my question to Catherine was substantive.  I wish to discuss
>>> with the Routing AD(s), Security people, and Benoit/Ron to understand
>>> the Routing/Operational issues.
>>> 
>>> "Must Not" configure is unrealistic.  People misconfigure. Yankee
>>> Group and other research houses places have indicated year-on-year
>>> 15-30% outages are caused by this misconfigured.  It's like the statement
>> "stuff happens."
>>> Stating "Must not" is like spitting into the wind.  You end up with
>>> stuff on your face.  What is the security area stating?  How does this
>>> review match with the path validation/security in SIDR.
>>> 
>>> Can we get Catherine or other security people to respond to my question?
>>> Cross-area review is useful to find wholes in our process and our
>>> assumptions.  I want to make sure I understand the valuable technical
>>> feedback the security review is providing.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Sue
>>> 
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: John G. Scudder [mailto:[e-mail]]
>>> Sent: Tuesday, July 17, 2012 10:38 AM
>>> To: [e-mail]
>>> Cc: [e-mail]; 'Catherine Meadows'; [e-mail];
>>> [e-mail]; [e-mail];
>>> 'Murphy, Sandra'
>>> Subject: Re: Spam:*******, Secdir Review of
>>> draft-ietf-idr-rfc4893bis-07 (resend of a resend)
>>> 
>>> Stewart,
>>> 
>>> I'm fine with the text you propose.
>>> 
>>> (I do find it a little odd to have this text -- either old or new --
>>> in the Security section since routing loops aren't normally though of
>>> as a security issue unless maliciously triggered -- which this one
>>> isn't described as being. So I would also be fine with changing the
>>> text but moving it to a different section. But that is quibbling.)
>>> 
>>> --John
>>> 
>>> On Jul 17, 2012, at 12:24 AM, Stewart Bryant wrote:
>>> 
>>>> Sue, John,
>>>> 
>>>> Is there any reason not to reword the text concerned to more
>>>> conventional format:
>>>> 
>>>> OLD
>>>> It is a misconfiguration to assign a non-mappable four-octet AS
>>>>    number as the "Member AS Number" in a BGP confederation before all
>>>>    the BGP speakers within the confederation have transitioned to
>>>>    support four-octet AS numbers.  Such a misconfiguration would weaken
>>>>    the AS path loop detection within a confederation.
>>>> 
>>>> NEW
>>>> 
>>>> A network operator MUST NOT assign a non-mappable four-octet AS
>>>> number as the "Member AS Number" in a BGP confederation before all
>>>> the BGP speakers within the confederation have transitioned to
>>>> support four-octet AS numbers, as such an assignment would weaken
>>>> the AS path loop detection within a confederation.
>>>> 
>>>> Stewart
>>>> 
>>>> On 17/07/2012 00:28, Susan Hares wrote:
>>>>> Catherine:
>>>>> 
>>>>> I've read and re-read this email for a week (7/9 - 7/16).
>>>>> 
>>>>> Misconfiguration is a fact of life in networks.  Security profiles
>>>>> must
>>> deal with this point.  We can all say you should not misconfigure
>>> networks - but life happens.  Therefore,  I'm confused by your
>>> question.  I would consider it is just a security event the authors
>> pointing happens.
>>>>> On your second comment
>>>>> 
>>>>> "I would also expect that the chance of routing loops arising out
>>>>> conversion from 4-octet to 2-octet occurring between confederations
>>>>> would be much less than of their occurring within a confederation
>>>>> (although one can't know for sure without knowing what the 4-octet
>>>>> to 2-octet mapping is), so following the recommendations in the
>>>>> Security Considerations would greatly reduce the probability of
>>>>> such a routing loop occurring.  Is this correct? "
>>>>> 
>>>>> It depends if someone configures a confederation within a
>> confederation.
>>> [see earlier comment on mis-configuration.] I've copied Sandy Murphy
>>> in case as SIDR chair can put this discussion into a different
>>> "security" specific light.
>>>>> Confused,
>>>>> 
>>>>> Sue
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> From: Catherine Meadows [mailto:[e-mail]]
>>>>> Sent: Monday, July 09, 2012 2:25 PM
>>>>> To: [e-mail]; [e-mail];
>>>>> [e-mail]
>>>>> Cc: Catherine Meadows
>>>>> Subject: Spam:*******, Secdir Review of
>>>>> draft-ietf-idr-rfc4893bis-07 (resend of a resend)
>>>>> 
>>>>> I managed to screw up the email address again.  Here it is for what
>>>>> I
>>> hope is the last time.
>>>>> My apologies again to everyone who receives *three* copies of this
>>> message.
>>>>> I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
>>>>> ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the
>>>>> IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the
>>>>> security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should
>>>>> treat these comments just like any other last call comments.
>>>>> 
>>>>> This document describes an added capability for four-octet
>>>>> Autonomous System
>>>>> (AS) numbers in BGP.  This is intended to  replace the older
>>>>> two-octet AS numbers, since that space is filling up.
>>>>> 
>>>>> In order to preserve backward compatibility, AS's using the
>>>>> four-octet systems (called New BGP speakers in the document) must
>>> advertise both four-octet and two-octet AS numbers.
>>>>> This is the case even if the New BGP Speaker does not have a
>>>>> globally
>>> unique two-octet number.
>>>>> The document says that in this case the two-octet number is
>>>>> obtained by mapping the four-octet number to the two-octet space.
>>>>> The procedure
>>> for doing this is not specified.
>>>>> The authors identify a risk of routing loops developing when
>>>>> ambiguities develops as a result of a BGP speaker using the old
>>>>> system aggregating two or more routes carrying 4-octet attributes.
>>>>> In the Security Configurations Section, the authors point out that
>>>>> an attacker might be able to exploit this in a denial of service
>> attack.
>>>>> They point out that it is a misconfiguration to assign 4-octet
>>>>> Member AS
>>> Numbers in a BGP confederation until all BGP speakers within the
>>> confederation have transitioned to support 4-octet numbers.
>>>>> I think that this is a good recommendation.  I just have a couple
>>>>> of
>>> minor comments.
>>>>> It's not clear to me what the status of "misconfiguration" is in
>>>>> the
>>> hierarchy of IETF.
>>>>> Is it more like SHALL NOT or SHOULD NOT?  Is there a reason why
>>>>> you're saying "misconfiguration" instead of one of those?
>>>>> 
>>>>> I would also expect that the chance of routing loops arising out
>>>>> conversion from 4-octet to 2-octet occurring between confederations
>>>>> would be much less than of their occurring within a confederation
>>>>> (although one can't know for sure without knowing what the 4-octet
>>>>> to 2-octet mapping is), so following the recommendations in the
>>>>> Security
>>> Considerations would greatly reduce the probability of such a routing
>>> loop occurring.  Is this correct?
>>>>> Cathy Meadows
>>>>> Catherine Meadows
>>>>> Naval Research Laboratory
>>>>> Code 5543
>>>>> 4555 Overlook Ave., S.W.
>>>>> Washington DC, 20375
>>>>> phone: [phone]
>>>>> fax: [phone]
>>>>> email: [e-mail]
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> --
>>>> For corporate legal information go to:
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> http://www.cisco.com/web/about/doing_business/legal/cri/index.html
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> .
>> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> For corporate legal information go to:
> 
> http://www.cisco.com/web/about/doing_business/legal/cri/index.html
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