DomainKey-Signature: a=rsa-sha1; c=nofws; d=gmail.com; s=gamma;
 h=mime-version:sender:in-reply-to:references:date
 :x-google-sender-auth:message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type
 :content-transfer-encoding;
 b=fuJ0ndhcb72Lrys9RHzPBhZYoVugaq5ho6sS5jtpdri31xdT1LwsBr0Z5zpbp+o0BX
 dfI+8TDJuALtJdVgB9LHnMI2Mz+k9nh0IyO1bJmio8NPECg2cJD+MtU5T7dy//3RpK4r
 m0vpo58p6kQDgpBOAyqpZTJCpIowj1TcRctH0=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Sender: barryleiba@gmail.com
In-Reply-To: <4D49DB50.7020702@labn.net>
References: <AANLkTi=EL2GqrOvePsPoiVZxrbRyFyCckOuYbLE+QCqS@mail.gmail.com>
 <4D49DB50.7020702@labn.net>
Date: Wed, 2 Feb 2011 18:27:13 -0500
Message-ID: <AANLkTi=zZC6tbeZTqWwFW0stBwboggoWsPwZsLDyw4EO@mail.gmail.com>
From: Barry Leiba <barryleiba@computer.org>
To: Lou Berger <lberger@labn.net>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Cc: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>,
 draft-ietf-ccamp-mpls-tp-cp-framework.all@tools.ietf.org, secdir@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-ietf-ccamp-mpls-tp-cp-framework-05
Precedence: list

Hi, Lou.

> It's hard to respond to your
> general comments as they are just general concerns.

Yes, indeed, and I don't necessarily expect anything.  I wish I knew
more about MPLS, for the purpose of giving this review.

>=A0My feeling is that this
> is just a framework and any specific protocol definitions will take place=
 in
> new documents and, as such, will contain their own security consideration=
s

Absolutely.  That's why I tried to be clear that my question isn't
about the security considerations section (which I think is correct as
it is), but about the security *requirements*.  If, as you folks
developed the 130+ functional requirements, you thought about whether
they generated new security requirements that might not have been
there before, and decided that they didn't, then that's fine.  If you
just said, "OK, any security requirements?  No, none that we can think
of," then you might have missed something by not thinking enough about
the requirements in that light.

But, again, I just wanted to raise the issue and ask what sort of
thought was put into it; I don't necessarily expect any specific
response.

Barry

> On 2/2/2011 4:37 PM, Barry Leiba wrote:
>>
>> I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's
>> ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the
>> IESG. =A0These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the
>> security area directors. =A0Document editors and WG chairs should treat
>> these comments just like any other last call comments.
>>
>> In particular, I don't know a lot about MPLS, whatever "TP"s and "G"s
>> and "PWE"s are attached to it. =A0I've tried to read this from a
>> security point of view only. =A0The GenART review has given an excellent
>> editorial look at the document, so I won't try to repeat that.
>>
>> I have only one concern, from the security viewpoint, and I'm not sure
>> how much of a concern it is.
>> Sections 2.1 to 2.3 list more than 130 requirements for the MPLS-TP
>> control plane. =A0Section 2.4, "Security Requirements", then says this:
>>
>> =A0 =A0There are no specific MPLS-TP control plane security requirements=
.
>> =A0 =A0The existing framework for MPLS and GMPLS security is documented =
in
>> =A0 =A0[RFC5920] and that document applies equally to MPLS-TP.
>>
>> I have no way to tell whether, perhaps, some of those 130+ functional
>> requirements ought to be generating some security requirements beyond
>> what's in RFC 5920. =A0For example, requirement 14, just to pick one:
>>
>> =A0 =A0 =A014. The MPLS-TP control plane must support the logical separa=
tion
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0of the control plane from the management and data pla=
ne
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0[RFC5654, requirement 15]. Note that this implies tha=
t the
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0addresses used in the control plane are independent f=
rom the
>> =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0 =A0addresses used in the management and data planes.
>>
>> Is it possible that requiring logical separation of the control plane
>> from the management and data planes might also introduce a security
>> requirement with respect to that separation? =A0Perhaps the working
>> group and the joint effort have already considered this for each
>> requirement, and all is well.
>>
>> I can't tell: there are far too many requirements and variables here,
>> and my knowledge of MPLS is far too slight. =A0I just think it's
>> important to bring up this point, and whenever I see discussion of
>> out-of-band controls, I wonder about the security implications.
>>
>> The security considerations section (6) points out that this document
>> is showing how other specifications provide the means to meet the
>> requirements listed here, and that those specifications have (and
>> possible future extension specifications will have) security
>> considerations sections that properly cover the issues. =A0I think
>> that's correct; my concern is only about whether any security
>> requirements might have been overlooked, which might necessitate an
>> unanticipated adaptation in order to use, say, GMPLS to satisfy
>> functional requirements here.
>>
>> Barry
>>