Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-isis-trill

Stewart Bryant <stbryant@cisco.com> Mon, 20 December 2010 19:03 UTC

Return-Path: <stbryant@cisco.com>
X-Original-To: secdir@core3.amsl.com
Delivered-To: secdir@core3.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 588E13A6A61; Mon, 20 Dec 2010 11:03:13 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -110.534
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-110.534 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[AWL=0.065, BAYES_00=-2.599, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-8, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([64.170.98.32]) by localhost (core3.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id LfgYH18Qd3Ua; Mon, 20 Dec 2010 11:03:12 -0800 (PST)
Received: from rtp-iport-2.cisco.com (rtp-iport-2.cisco.com [64.102.122.149]) by core3.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 398283A6A63; Mon, 20 Dec 2010 11:03:11 -0800 (PST)
Authentication-Results: rtp-iport-2.cisco.com; dkim=neutral (message not signed) header.i=none
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: AvsEAG83D01AZnwM/2dsb2JhbACkF3OjWoJMDgGYWIVJBIsBhgw
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.60,203,1291593600"; d="scan'208";a="195249130"
Received: from rtp-core-1.cisco.com ([64.102.124.12]) by rtp-iport-2.cisco.com with ESMTP; 20 Dec 2010 19:05:06 +0000
Received: from cisco.com (mrwint.cisco.com [64.103.71.48]) by rtp-core-1.cisco.com (8.13.8/8.14.3) with ESMTP id oBKJ54Qt001607; Mon, 20 Dec 2010 19:05:04 GMT
Received: from stbryant-mac2.lan (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by cisco.com (8.11.7p3+Sun/8.8.8) with ESMTP id oBKJ51806392; Mon, 20 Dec 2010 19:05:02 GMT
Message-ID: <4D0FA8DD.2040704@cisco.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2010 19:05:01 +0000
From: Stewart Bryant <stbryant@cisco.com>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 10.6; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13) Gecko/20101207 Lightning/1.0b2 Thunderbird/3.1.7
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Donald Eastlake <d3e3e3@gmail.com>
References: <tslipywbakv.fsf@mit.edu> <tsl4oac15m0.fsf@mit.edu> <4D0BDDC0.6060201@acm.org> <tsl7hf7zqtp.fsf@mit.edu> <AANLkTim-RGc1mnaVVjLP=8Y_7OV+tmT=OTXUmZ6q=Ddm@mail.gmail.com> <AANLkTi=LMZB8HTRXXEd+gKx+haAvn_vywkF6PUzVsr=p@mail.gmail.com> <tsltyi8xuo7.fsf@mit.edu> <AANLkTi=ES=zgq3e0mGN7er4guZ4czaLWxcjRDOEapzuv@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <AANLkTi=ES=zgq3e0mGN7er4guZ4czaLWxcjRDOEapzuv@mail.gmail.com>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Cc: ietf@ietf.org, secdir@ietf.org, Erik Nordmark <nordmark@acm.org>, draft-ietf-isis-trill@tools.ietf.org, Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
Subject: Re: [secdir] Secdir review of draft-ietf-isis-trill
X-BeenThere: secdir@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.9
Precedence: list
Reply-To: stbryant@cisco.com
List-Id: Security Area Directorate <secdir.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/secdir>, <mailto:secdir-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/secdir>
List-Post: <mailto:secdir@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:secdir-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/secdir>, <mailto:secdir-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2010 19:03:13 -0000

On 20/12/2010 18:43, Donald Eastlake wrote:
> Hi,
>
> On Mon, Dec 20, 2010 at 11:42 AM, Sam Hartman<hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>;  wrote:
>>>>>>> "Radia" == Radia Perlman<radiaperlman@gmail.com>;  writes:
>>     Radia>  No objections.  Radia
>>
>>
>> Can I get someone to confirm that the text in the proposed sentences is
>> substantially true?
>> I think so but I'm not an IS-IS expert.
> LSPs have sequences number, etc., and are idempotent. I think only
> Hellos have the potential replay Denial of Service problem. So I would
> suggest changing to:
>
> "Even when the IS-IS
> authentication is used, replays of Hello packets can create
> denial-of-service conditaions; see RFC 6039 for details. These issues
> are similar in scope to those discussed in section 6.2 of
> draft-ietf-trill-rbridge-protocol, and the same mitigations may apply."
>
> Thanks,
> Donald
... as I recall from discussions with the ISIS WG the changes that were 
made to ISIS for TRILL make it more vulnerable to a hello attack than 
vanilla ISIS. This I understand is because there is more work to be done 
in processing a TRILL hello. Is that correct?

- Stewart