[secdir] draft-ietf-tsvwg-rsvp-security-groupkeying-10.txt

Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> Tue, 09 August 2011 19:12 UTC

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Date: Tue, 09 Aug 2011 15:13:09 -0400
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From: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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Subject: [secdir] draft-ietf-tsvwg-rsvp-security-groupkeying-10.txt
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This is a quick re-check.

I reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's 
ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the 
IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the 
security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat 
these comments just like any other last call comments.

This document (draft-ietf-tsvwg-rsvp-security-groupkeying-10.txt) 
compares group keying vs. per-neighbor or per-interface keying 
options for RSVP. It also examines the applicability of various 
protocol security mechanisms (e.g., IPsec and the RSVP INTEGRITY 
object) in different "trust" contexts, and for different RSVP message 
types.

This is a very well-written document. The Security Consideration 
section is but one sentence, because the whole document is an 
analysis of security issues associated with key management and 
protocol options for RSVP security. I wish more documents were of 
this quality!