Re: [secdir] [payload] sec-dir review of draft-ietf-payload-rtp-opus-08

"Ben Campbell" <ben@nostrum.com> Tue, 07 April 2015 16:08 UTC

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From: "Ben Campbell" <ben@nostrum.com>
To: "Stephen Farrell" <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>
Date: Tue, 07 Apr 2015 11:08:03 -0500
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Subject: Re: [secdir] [payload] sec-dir review of draft-ietf-payload-rtp-opus-08
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On 7 Apr 2015, at 10:59, Stephen Farrell wrote:

> Hiya,
>
> Sorry for coming late to this thread (#include <itwasaweekend.h> :-)
>
> On 06/04/15 19:44, Robert Sparks wrote:
> [...]
>>>
>>> I'm saying this is the wrong layer to solve the problem.
>>>
>>> We had some work planned to better specify this in general for RTP. 
>>> I
>>> think the right answer is finish that work. If we do that right, it
>>> should apply regardless of codec.
>>>
>> That's exactly right.
>>
>> We've had this conversation several times before. The individual 
>> payload
>> documents are not the place to add the kind of guidance Derek is 
>> asking
>> for. They should be about how you put things in RTP, not how
>> applications use (and secure RTP), unless there's something unique 
>> about
>> the payload that interacts with the general mechanics for using and
>> securing RTP.
>
> Robert is correct.
>
>> Stephen will remember that we've queued up work on a document that 
>> would
>> describe securing unicast RTP set up with SDP (capturing the outcome 
>> of
>> the rtpsec bof at IETF68). The last I heard on the subject Dan Wing 
>> was
>> taking the token to work on that document, but it's been awhile. 
>> That's
>> where the effort should focus - an individual payload document is not
>> the right place.
>
> I do recall that now that you mention it. But if it's not actually
> going to happen, then maybe we should rethink the approach, even if
> that'd result in repeated text in payload format drafts.
>
> Who knows the status of that work?

I am trying to track that down. But I am working under the assumption it 
didn't go anywhere.

But I'd rather try to revive that work than to take a piecemeal approach 
of adding it to payload drafts. That doesn't help with pre-existing 
payload formats, and I think asking RTP application designers to treat 
privacy requirements on a per-codec basis is untenable. I suspect the 
best we could expect out of that is for people to ignore us.

If we can agree to leave this out of payload drafts, I will track down 
and try really hard to restart the RTP level effort.

/Ben