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Re: [secdir] Review of draft-ietf-opsec-routing-protocols-crypto-issues-04

Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@oracle.com> Thu, 27 May 2010 19:35 UTC

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Date: Thu, 27 May 2010 14:28:50 -0500
From: Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@oracle.com>
To: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [secdir] Review of draft-ietf-opsec-routing-protocols-crypto-issues-04
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On Thu, May 27, 2010 at 02:47:40PM -0400, Sam Hartman wrote:
> This document talks a lot about collision attacks against MD5 and then
> draws the conclusion that MD5 should not be used as part of a MAC.  I
> agree that it is prudent to provide alternatives to MD5.  However, I
> think the current text implies that collision attacks against MD5 are
> applicable to attacks against the use of MD5 in routing protocols.

I noticed this, but decided it was a non-issue for me.  The document
isn't intended to provide advice, though advice is effectively implied.
And as for MD5, I won't be sorry to see it go, whether used as the
foundation for a MAC or not.

Nico
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