Re: [secdir] [payload] sec-dir review of draft-ietf-payload-rtp-opus-08

"Roni Even" <ron.even.tlv@gmail.com> Tue, 07 April 2015 13:34 UTC

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From: "Roni Even" <ron.even.tlv@gmail.com>
To: "'Jean-Marc Valin'" <jmvalin@mozilla.com>, "'Colin Perkins'" <csp@csperkins.org>, "'Robert Sparks'" <rjsparks@nostrum.com>
References: <sjmoaosz53h.fsf@securerf.ihtfp.org> <54E3A32F.2010008@jmvalin.ca> <760B7D45D1EFF74988DBF5C2122830C24D064CDE@szxpml507-mbx.exmail.huawei.com> <sjmk2zdzv6g.fsf@securerf.ihtfp.org> <916F29B3-E392-481B-A269-FBA58DFEF14D@nostrum.com> <551C612B.4030702@mozilla.com> <C3DD8EE5-B066-4C06-99F4-B9147A128811@nostrum.com> <C17AE3D5-F62D-42A3-9F1F-885BF1B984EB@nostrum.com> <551EFB9C.4040504@xiph.org> <sjmy4m5grwp.fsf@securerf.ihtfp.org> <269A06E2-6704-4E5E-BBFD-92F157639261@nostrum.com> <5522D40E.8040402@nostrum.com> <73626E80-1EBA-4A85-83DD-32423649DBD1@csperkins.org> <035501d0711a$7856b0a0$690411e0$@gmail.com> <5523C5AE.7040108@mozilla.com>
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Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2015 16:33:18 +0300
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Cc: secdir@ietf.org, payload@ietf.org, jspittka@gmail.com, iesg@ietf.org, payload-chairs@tools.ietf.org, koenvos74@gmail.com
Subject: Re: [secdir] [payload] sec-dir review of draft-ietf-payload-rtp-opus-08
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Hi Jean-Marc,
I think this sounds good, I suggest also to mention RFC6562 
Roni

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jean-Marc Valin [mailto:jmvalin@mozilla.com]
> Sent: 07 April, 2015 2:55 PM
> To: Roni Even; 'Colin Perkins'; 'Robert Sparks'
> Cc: secdir@ietf.org; payload@ietf.org; jspittka@gmail.com; iesg@ietf.org;
> payload-chairs@tools.ietf.org; koenvos74@gmail.com; 'Derek Atkins'
> Subject: Re: [payload] [secdir] sec-dir review of
draft-ietf-payload-rtp-opus-08
> 
> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
> Hash: SHA1
> 
> Does anyone object to this earlier proposal?
> 
> "Opus does not provide any built-in confidentiality or integrity
protection.
> Protection requirements vary between RTP applications. See RFC 7201 and
RFC
> 7202 for a discussion."
> 
> If not, that's probably what should go in the RFC (assuming it works for
> Kathleen Moriarty's DISCUSS too).
> 
> 	Jean-Marc
> 
> On 07/04/15 06:06 AM, Roni Even wrote:
> >
> >
> >> -----Original Message----- From: payload
> >> [mailto:payload-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Colin Perkins
> >> Sent: 06 April, 2015 9:50 PM To: Robert Sparks Cc:
> >> secdir@ietf.org; payload@ietf.org; jspittka@gmail.com; iesg@ietf.org;
> >> payload-chairs@tools.ietf.org; koenvos74@gmail.com; Derek Atkins
> >> Subject: Re: [payload] [secdir] sec-dir review of
> > draft-ietf-payload-rtp-opus-08
> >>
> >> On 6 Apr 2015, at 19:44, Robert Sparks <rjsparks@nostrum.com>
> >> wrote:
> >>> inline (particularly for Derek) On 4/6/15 11:13 AM, Ben Campbell
> >>> wrote:
> >>>> On 6 Apr 2015, at 11:09, Derek Atkins wrote:
> >>>>
> >>>>> "Timothy B. Terriberry" <tterribe@xiph.org> writes:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> Ben Campbell wrote:
> >>>>>>>> So my suggestion would be something more to the effect of:
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> "Opus does not provide any built-in confidentiality or
> >>>>>>>> integrity protection. Protection requirements vary between RTP
> >>>>>>>> applications. See RFC 7201 and RFC 7202 for a discussion.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> This seems like reasonable text to me. I agree with the rationale
> >>>>>> that preceded it. As much as I want to see encryption everywhere,
> >>>>>> a payload format is not the right place to mandate it.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> As was stated already in this thread, the expected follow up
> >>>>> drafts for MTI security have not been written.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I leave it up to the Security ADs who have the real power here,
> >>>>> but I still prefer my original wording (including the SHOULD).
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I understand your reluctance because it's a codec, but it's the
> >>>>> first codec to get through the process since the Perpass work,
> >>>>> which basically says "everything should be encrypted."  Since you
> >>>>> cannot go back in time to modify the existing RFCs, you can
> >>>>> augment them going forward by other additions.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> As for the concern about "different security requirements for
> >>>>> different codecs", frankly I don't buy that argument.
> >>>>> Either your RTP application supports security or it doesn't.  Once
> >>>>> it does, it should be able to negotiate that along side the codec
> >>>>> negotitation. So I don't see the concern -- we're not mandating a
> >>>>> specific security technology, just that you SHOULD use one.  Well,
> >>>>> that's true regardless of the codec, isn't it?
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Or are you really saying "We don't care about security.  We just
> >>>>> want to be able to use this codec in existing, insecure RTP
> >>>>> applications without adding new securty measures"?
> >>>>
> >>>> I'm saying this is the wrong layer to solve the problem.
> >>>>
> >>>> We had some work planned to better specify this in general for RTP.
> >>>> I
> > think
> >> the right answer is finish that work. If we do that right, it should
> >> apply regardless of codec.
> >>>>
> >>> That's exactly right.
> >>>
> >>> We've had this conversation several times before. The individual
> >>> payload
> >> documents are not the place to add the kind of guidance Derek is
> >> asking
> > for.
> >> They should be about how you put things in RTP, not how applications
> >> use
> > (and
> >> secure RTP), unless there's something unique about the payload that
> > interacts
> >> with the general mechanics for using and securing RTP.
> >>>
> >>> Stephen will remember that we've queued up work on a document that
> >>> would
> >> describe securing unicast RTP set up with SDP (capturing the outcome
> >> of
> > the
> >> rtpsec bof at IETF68). The last I heard on the subject Dan Wing was
> >> taking
> > the
> >> token to work on that document, but it's been awhile. That's where
> >> the
> > effort
> >> should focus - an individual payload document is not the right place.
> >>
> >> +1
> >>
> >> As Robert, and others, say, RTP payload format documents are not the
> >> right place to mandate security mechanisms. This is the point of
> >> RFC7202, which
> > is
> >> about how strong security can best be defined for classes of RTP
> > applications.
> >> This is not in conflict with the perpass work, since the goal of
> >> RFC7202
> > is to
> >> show how to provide strong security.
> > [Roni Even] What Colin says +1
> >
> >>
> >> -- Colin Perkins https://csperkins.org/
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________ payload mailing
> list
> >> payload@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/payload
> >
> > _______________________________________________ payload mailing list
> > payload@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/payload
> >
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