Re: [secdir] SECDIR Review of draft-zeilenga-ldap-dontusecopy-08

Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com> Mon, 18 October 2010 06:51 UTC

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Date: Sun, 17 Oct 2010 07:20:54 +0100
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To: Phillip Hallam-Baker <hallam@gmail.com>
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Cc: Kurt.Zeilenga@Isode.COM, iesg@ietf.org, secdir@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [secdir] SECDIR Review of draft-zeilenga-ldap-dontusecopy-08
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Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:

> I have reviewed this document as part of the security directorate's 
> ongoing effort to review all IETF documents being processed by the 
> IESG.  These comments were written primarily for the benefit of the 
> security area directors.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat 
> these comments just like any other last call comments.
>
> This document describes what is essentially a 'send original, not 
> cached flag' for LDAP.
>
> Only security issue I can see here is that the following does not give 
> the purpose very clearly.
>
>4.  Security Considerations
>
>  This control is intended to be provided where providing service using
>  copied information might lead to unexpected application behavior.
>  Designers of directory applications should consider where it is
>  appropriate for clients to provide this control.  Designers should
>  consider whether use of copied information, in particular security and
>  policy information, may result insecure behavior.
>
>
> I would suggest the following instead
>
>4.  Security Considerations
>
>  This control is intended to be provided where providing service using
>  copied information might lead to unexpected application behavior.
>
>  Use of the Don't Use Copy control may permit an attacker to perform
>  or amplify a Denial of Service attack by causing additional server
>  resources to be employed.
>
>  LDAP is frequently used for storage and distribution of security
>  sensitive information, including access control and security policy
>  information. Failure to use the Don't Use Copy control may thus
>  permit an attacker to gain unauthorized access by allowing reliance
>  on stale data.
>
> The meaning is unchanged, but the additional context might help the 
> reader.

I like your text better, as it is much more explicit about threats.