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Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-yount-krb-cred-clear-text-01.txt

Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu> Thu, 18 August 2011 22:22 UTC

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From: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
To: Russell J Yount <rjy@cmu.edu>
References: <EBDDC31C-A2D0-4FF5-8EE8-D7061EA23805@kumari.net> <tslhb5e31v8.fsf@mit.edu> <26BE721B42199440805DB836552EA796053F1A@PGH-MSGMB-03.andrew.ad.cmu.edu>
Date: Thu, 18 Aug 2011 18:23:15 -0400
In-Reply-To: <26BE721B42199440805DB836552EA796053F1A@PGH-MSGMB-03.andrew.ad.cmu.edu> (Russell J. Yount's message of "Thu, 18 Aug 2011 21:24:14 +0000")
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Cc: "draft-yount-krb-cred-clear-text.all@tools.ietf.org" <draft-yount-krb-cred-clear-text.all@tools.ietf.org>, Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>, "iesg@ietf.org" <iesg@ietf.org>, "secdir@ietf.org" <secdir@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [secdir] secdir review of draft-yount-krb-cred-clear-text-01.txt
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>>>>> "Russell" == Russell J Yount <rjy@cmu.edu> writes:

    Russell> Sam, I was thinking an intermediate node resending a number
    Russell> KRB-CRED messages could substitute previously received
    Russell> KRB-CRED messages.

    Russell> Eg.  Node receives Joe's credentials and forwards Joe's
    Russell> credential.  Node receives Jill's credentials and forwards
    Russell> Joe's credential.  Whatever action Jill credentials where
    Russell> be used to perform now would be performed as Joe.

Right such can happen.
Part of hop-by-hop security is trusting the hops.
There are situations where this is appropriate and situations where it
is entirely inappropriate.

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