Re: [secdir] proxies and forwarding of credentials, was: SECDIR review of draft-ietf-httpbis-p7-auth-24
Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net> Thu, 31 October 2013 22:59 UTC
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From: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>
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Date: Fri, 01 Nov 2013 09:59:07 +1100
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To: Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com>
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Cc: secdir <secdir@ietf.org>, Pete Resnick <presnick@qti.qualcomm.com>, "Julian F. Reschke" <julian.reschke@greenbytes.de>, Mark Nottingham <mnot@pobox.com>, "Mankin, Allison" <amankin@verisign.com>, HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>, Barry Leiba <barryleiba@computer.org>, Roy Fielding <fielding@gbiv.com>
Subject: Re: [secdir] proxies and forwarding of credentials, was: SECDIR review of draft-ietf-httpbis-p7-auth-24
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It entirely depends upon the way that they’re cooperating… sometimes you’d want to forward them, sometimes not. If we were defining a proxy authentication cooperation protocol here, I could understand a MUST here, but as we’re not, I don’t think we want to constrain how one might operate… Cheers, On 1 Nov 2013, at 7:01 am, Stephen Kent <kent@bbn.com> wrote: > Julian, > > I alos don't have personal experience with the proxy situation. I was just commenting on > what appeared to be a logical inconsistency in the text. > > I defer to others, who have such experience, on this detail. > > Steve >> On 2013-10-29 20:35, Stephen Kent wrote: >>> ... >>> In Section 4.3, the text says: >>> >>> A proxy MAY relay >>> >>> the credentials from the client request to the next proxy if that is >>> >>> the mechanism by which the proxies cooperatively authenticate a given >>> >>> request. >>> >>> If, as stated here, a set of proxies cooperatively authenticate a >>> request, then isn’t this a MUST vs. a MAY? >>> ... >> >> Maybe. I have no experience with proxy authentication, and this piece of text was copied from <http://greenbytes.de/tech/webdav/rfc2616.html#rfc.section.14.34>. >> >> Perhaps this is a case where we should drop the RFC2119 keywords and just make a statement such as: >> >> "A proxy can relay the credentials from the client request to the next proxy if that is the mechanism by which the proxies cooperatively authenticate a given request." >> >> ? >> >> Best regards, Julian >> > -- Mark Nottingham http://www.mnot.net/
- [secdir] SECDIR review of draft-ietf-httpbis-p7-a… Stephen Kent
- [secdir] RFC2119 vs "ought" etc, was: SECDIR revi… Julian Reschke
- Re: [secdir] SECDIR review of draft-ietf-httpbis-… Julian Reschke
- Re: [secdir] RFC2119 vs "ought" etc, was: SECDIR … Richard Barnes
- Re: [secdir] RFC2119 vs "ought" etc, was: SECDIR … Julian Reschke
- Re: [secdir] RFC2119 vs "ought" etc, was: SECDIR … Stephen Kent
- [secdir] WWW-Authenticate parsing quirks, was: SE… Julian Reschke
- Re: [secdir] SECDIR review of draft-ietf-httpbis-… Stephen Kent
- Re: [secdir] SECDIR review of draft-ietf-httpbis-… Julian Reschke
- Re: [secdir] RFC2119 vs "ought" etc, was: SECDIR … Richard Barnes
- Re: [secdir] RFC2119 vs "ought" etc, was: SECDIR … Barry Leiba
- [secdir] Reuse of credentials per realm, was: SEC… Julian Reschke
- Re: [secdir] Reuse of credentials per realm, was:… Stephen Kent
- Re: [secdir] Reuse of credentials per realm, was:… Julian Reschke
- [secdir] proxies and forwarding of credentials, w… Julian Reschke
- [secdir] additional mechanisms on top of the auth… Julian Reschke
- Re: [secdir] Reuse of credentials per realm, was:… Stephen Kent
- Re: [secdir] additional mechanisms on top of the … Julian Reschke
- Re: [secdir] additional mechanisms on top of the … Nico Williams
- Re: [secdir] proxies and forwarding of credential… Bjoern Hoehrmann
- Re: [secdir] additional mechanisms on top of the … Bjoern Hoehrmann
- Re: [secdir] additional mechanisms on top of the … Bjoern Hoehrmann
- Re: [secdir] additional mechanisms on top of the … Stephen Kent
- Re: [secdir] additional mechanisms on top of the … Julian Reschke
- Re: [secdir] proxies and forwarding of credential… Stephen Kent
- Re: [secdir] proxies and forwarding of credential… Mark Nottingham
- Re: [secdir] additional mechanisms on top of the … Julian Reschke
- Re: [secdir] proxies and forwarding of credential… Stephen Kent